The Famine in South Tipperary – Part One

By Denis G. Marnane

Introduction

On 27 October 1845, T.C. Foster, whom *The Times* of London had commissioned to report on Ireland and its problems, described how in the countryside around Tipperary, Cahir and Cashel "most of the fields are well squared and fenced and there are many well-built and decent-looking farmhouses".[1] In any examination of South Tipperary on the eve of the Famine, the colours used were largely black and red, and the picture produced one of doom and gloom.[2] But this emphasis on crime and poverty was not the whole picture.

Of the six Munster counties, while Tipperary's percentage of its population who were illiterate was very high (52.1%), it was the lowest in the province.[3] Regarding the quality of housing in Tipperary before the Famine, attention was centred on the preponderance of third and fourth class dwellings (the latter category hardly deserving the name dwellings). However, with reference to good quality houses in the county, Tipperary again features very well in comparison with the rest of Munster.

TABLE 1

Percentage of 1st and 2nd class houses – Munster counties[4]

Waterford	21.6	Limerick	11.5
Tipperary	17.2	Clare	11.5
Cork	13.4	Kerry	7.1

If one looks at the percentage of the very best houses (1st class), the county ranked with Cork (1.4%) and just behind Waterford (1.6%).

Given that there is a relationship between urbanisation and commercial activity, Tipperary scored well with regard to both the number of its towns and the percentage of its population living in them. The towns in Tipperary were by the 1840s centres of very considerable poverty and distress, but they had also undergone several decades of growth and a measure of prosperity.[5]

TABLE 2

Population of towns as a percentage of county population[6]

Waterford	22.8	(7)*	Limerick	16.8 (3)
Cork	20.3	(21)	Kerry	8.8 (5)
Tipperary	16.9	(11)	Clare	6.7 (4)

* = (Number of towns)

In terms of infrastructure, the county had received considerable public and private investment. New roads were opened up, most famously the Anglesey roads from Tipperary to Nenagh and from Newport to Thurles.[7] By 1841 the road-surveyor of the south riding had 2,089 miles of road under his charge.[8] Tipperary, however, was no different from other counties with reference to the mixture of politics and parsimony on the part of grand juries and the construction of roads. The matter, for example, of cutting a new road through the Glen of Aherlow at the foot of the Galtees was a saga in itself.[9]

Road transport in the county had, of course, the advantage of the enterprising Charles Bianconi, who from his base in Clonmel served a network of 3,800 miles by 1843.[10] Coinciding with the outbreak of famine in the 1840s was the spread of the rail network. The Limerick-Tipperary line was opened in May 1848 and the Limerick Junction was formally opened in July of that year.[11]

In comparison with other counties, Tipperary was well provided with institutions for medical care, though perhaps in the context "care" is the wrong word. In the early 1840s the county had one infirmary (which was the norm), but its 12 fever hospitals put it well ahead of other Munster counties. Only Cork with 14 was better provided for; Kerry had 2 and Clare 1. With 36 dispensaries Tipperary was also second to Cork.[12]

In no sphere of activity was the role of the state more obvious than the maintenance of law and order. In Tipperary there was no greater evidence of the willingness, not to say determination, to intervene, in the lives of the people. The police barracks (whether temporary or permanent) spread throughout the countryside attested to this. In 1824 the county had a constabulary force of 186. By 1837, this had increased to 733 and in 1842 the number was 928.

This figure not only headed the table for the province, but for the entire country. In fact, Tipperary had more police in 1842 than Waterford, Limerick and Clare combined.[13] Apart from the question of the people of the county being grateful for this level of state investment, it was nowhere clearer that the state could and did adopt an interventionist role, a point of no little importance in the late 1840s when the people were crying out for the state to intervene.

This introduction to the story of the Famine in South Tipperary seeks to make the point that the emphasis on poverty and violence in the previous article was only part of the reality of life in the region, though in the context of the Famine it was the most important part. However, a corrective to this bleak picture is, for example, the extent to which various banks opened branches in the towns of the region in the decades before the Famine.

TABLE 3

Bank branches in South Tipperary before the Famine[14]

	Bank of I	Prov Bk	Nat Bk	Tipp Bk	Ag & Comm
Clonmel	1825	1825	1835	1842	
Carrick			1835	1841	
Cashel			1836		
Tipperary			1835	1838	1835

There was, of course, a degree of private banking in the region prior to this, with families like Scully in Tipperary, Riall in Clonmel and Sausse in Carrick-on-Suir. Within Munster, Tipperary county with its 19 bank branches compares with Cork with 24. Clare had 6 and Limerick had 5.

An indication of the prosperity of the various towns in South Tipperary relative to each other

may be had from the amount of money received by the post offices in these towns in 1836. The figure for Cahir (which did not have a bank) was £511, an increase of nearly 32% on the 1830 figure. The situation in the other towns was as follows: Carrick-on-Suir £716 (17%), Cashel £843 (23%), Clogheen £278 (2%), Clonmel £2,930 (19%) and Tipperary £1,066 (47%).

Such wealth as there was in the county was in land rather than business or industry. The 1841 census, with its information on occupations, makes it clear that, while there was a certain amount of cottage industry, the service area predominated. There were 208 millers, 22 brewers and 11 distillers, but 2,676 spinners of wool and 4,286 spinners of "unspecified classes".[16] A visitor to any of the towns in the county had a wide choice of shops, selling, however, a very narrow range of goods.

On the Main St in Tipperary town, for example, on the very eve of the Famine there were 30 shops dealing in alcohol and groceries (probably in that order), 21 bakeries, 13 drapers and 6 tobacconists. Other services such as blacksmiths, shoemakers, butchers, carpenters, coopers, harness makers and tailors generally conducted their businesses on the streets off the Main St.[17] Very few of these concerns provided employment to other than family members.

The majority of the population depended on the land. As described in the previous article, for those at the bottom of the scale land was not a question of generating income but rather of ensuring survival by providing the means of growing potatoes. At the top of the scale, however, for those individuals (and in some cases institutions such as Trinity College) land was there to generate income.

With regard to these owners of land, the question may be asked: how much income was generated? If this can be answered, a second question is a comparison between Tipperary and the other Munster counties. The income in question is not the total revenue generated by land in Tipperary. Because of the number of interests between the head landlord at the top of the scale and the cottier at the bottom, this would be impossible to calculate. Any estimate therefore refers only to agricultural head rents. For any given acre of Irish agricultural land, it was generally the case that a number of separate interests fed from it, both literally and metaphorically.

In comparing counties, their relative size and fertility have to be taken into account. In this respect "in proportion to its extent [Tipperary] contains less unimproved land than any other in the south of Ireland". This "unimproved" land included nearly 24,000 acres of plantations and over 13,500 acres under water. Of the 178,000 acres of uncultivated land, it was thought by Richard Griffith that some 90,000 acres could be reclaimed.[18]

TABLE 4

Arable land and head rents, Munster counties, c. 1845[19]

County	Area (acres)	% Arable	Head rent estimate (£000)
Clare	827,266	55	538.2
Cork	1,839,818	71	1,211.0
Kerry	1,185,319	35	391.2
Limerick	678,083	78	908.7
Tipperary	1,059,373	79.6	956.0
Waterford	460,028	71	362.9

These figures confirm that Tipperary generally, and the south of the county in particular, was better off than most other regions of Munster. It might be expected therefore that, should

disaster strike, the county would be in a better position than most and that the consequences would be less terrible. The 1841 census gave another set of figures to reinforce this argument, namely population density. Specifically, the number of persons per square mile of arable land were as follows: Clare (377), Cork (334), Kerry (416), Limerick (333), Tipperary (276) and Waterford (293).[20]

One final point may be made about Tipperary on the eve of the Famine, again confirming that, while there were very serious social and economic difficulties such as poverty, under-employment and over-dependence on the potato, people were generally healthy. One visitor to the county in 1841 described the peasants as physically "the finest men I ever saw", a sentiment not uncommon in such accounts.[21] A recent study of the personal statistics of over 4,000 people committed for trial in Clonmel between March 1845 and February 1848 found that "the people of Clonmel and its hinterland were quite tall by the standards of the mid-nineteenth century". The average height of men between 22 and 39 was 66.4 inches. This was marginally better than the corresponding data for rural and urban England and for some continental countries.

While a potato diet was undoubtedly monotonous, it produced people who were physically as good as, if not better than, working-class people in richer countries. Another finding from this study was that prisoners declaring an ability to write were "considerably" taller than those who did not. This may be explained by the fact that families who were in a position to make their children literate were likely to be also in a position to provide a nutritional edge.[22]

2 – 1845

A story from around Carrick-on-Suir called "Paddy Mulcahy and the enchanted potatoes" describes the hero cooking his pot of potatoes and then throwing them out on a table only to find to his horror a great commotion among the potatoes, large eyes staring at him, grinning faces mocking him and thick white lips opening ready to devour him.[23] As an image of the way in which people felt betrayed by the potato, this has a graphic power and conveys a little of the nightmare which a whole country was about to experience.

In late October the *Tipperary Free Press* published a letter which began: "There is no disputing the extent of this fatal evil. The whole stay of the people is lost". The letter continued: "To avert it is the business of every man ... and above all the business of Government. But to be of real value, the steps must be immediate".[24] A week later this heartfelt cry was echoed in another local newspaper, one of bitter anti-nationalist sentiment, the *Tipperary Constitution*. "The hour for acting has arrived; in the name of our common humanity, let not that hour be allowed to pass heedlessly by".[25]

A variety of other correspondents reflected something of the mixture of feelings in the wider community. For example, John Carden of Barnane with great conviction delivered himself of a recipe for salvaging something from diseased potatoes so that a kind of potato flour could be produced.[26] This emphasis on the need for action of some kind was reinforced by the fact that local newspapers reprinted a good deal of opinion from other sources about the potato disease. One gets the impression that, given the progress of science, somewhere there must be a remedy, if only it could be identified.[27]

One obvious factor to blame was the weather. The official view regarding the weather in 1845 was that it was not remarkable either for the quantity of rain or the number of wet days. In fact the rainfall was below average.[28] Locally and at the time the perception was rather different. In the middle of August there was some very heavy rain. Then in the last few days of August and into September the weather was fine.

However, just prior to the digging of the "late" crop of potatoes in early and mid October, the weather changed again into what was described as "one continuous downpour". The *Limerick Chronicle* expressed the view that the "distemper" was a result of "excessive moisture".[30] In the absence of knowledge about the disease this was not an unreasonable opinion.

That October the government had established a scientific commission to come up with some answers. It failed to identify the nature of the disease or the chemical compound that would become the universal remedy. Unfortunately, it did nothing about the large numbers of diseased potatoes abandoned in the fields which, because of a mild winter, were able to act as a potential source of infection in 1846. Also, concerned that there would a sufficient quantity of potatoes for seed in the following season, it is likely that potatoes that appeared healthy were used.[31]

It has been estimated that between one-quarter and one-third of the potato crop was "lost" in 1845. In Carrick it was stated that around one-third of the population depended on the potato, and that even though the 1844 crop had been abundant it had been insufficient for the needs of that district. It was explained that thanks to improvements in the navigation of the Suir, potatoes from other districts were transported with relative ease to Carrick.

In June and July 1845 in excess of 60,000 barrels of potatoes had been purchased at "our Quay", one-third at least of which were for rural districts.[33] Against this background, the damage to a substantial part of the 1845 crop caused consternation, not least because there would be no replacement crop until August 1846. How would the people survive in the meantime?

In October the Mansion House Committee was formed and demands were made for the kind of measures brought into play in response to earlier potato shortages. Unusually and fortunately, the Prime Minister of the day had experience of Ireland, having been Chief Secretary during an earlier crisis in 1817. In November, the P.M., Sir Robert Peel arranged for the purchase of £100,000 worth of Indian corn and also established a temporary Relief Commission which was to co-ordinate local relief measures which, however, did not come on stream until 1846.

By the end of 1845 the cry to close the ports and cease the export of food from Ireland was being heard with a bitterness that has intensified over the years. "The continental ports are closing against the export of food. Why are not similar precautions taken here?"[34] The governments of a number of countries, including Belgium and Sweden, had closed their ports.[35] The point was hardly missed that these countries were of course in charge of their own destinies. In net terms, the balance between grain exported and imported did not change until 1847.

TABLE 5

Grain Exports and Imports 1844-48[36] (in thousands of tons)

Date	Exports	Imports	Net flow outward
1844	424	30	+394
1845	513	28	+485
1846	284	197	+87
1847	146	889	–743
1848	314	439	–125

In politics perception is often more important than reality. The popular perception is that "the English" allowed, if not encouraged, food to flow out of Ireland at a time when the

population was starving. Austin Bourke has pointed out that if all the grain exported in 1846 remained in Ireland it would compensate for less than one-tenth of the potato shortfall.[37] It may be argued that the government, by refusing to interfere with the market, at least by 1847 brought about a net inflow of food.[38]

But none of this matters. The fact remains that food left the country while many of its people went hungry. In Clonmel in late October 1845, for example, it was business as usual in the market, with a good supply of grain. A large amount of business was done at "advanced" prices. The situation was similar in Limerick, where it was noted that the increased price of oats was caused by large and urgent orders from Scotland, where the blight had also affected the potato crop.[39]

3 – 1846

"Employment is the panacea required by all" was an oft repeated cry in the Spring of 1846.[40] In Tipperary town it was hoped that the building of a military barracks, something that had been on the cards for some time, would go ahead. (At the time the Erasmus Smith grammar school was occupied by the military and, in fact, the building of a barracks did not proceed until the 1870s.)[41] Also in Tipperary town the agent to the Smith-Barry estate was praised for giving employment to around 100 men who were occupied in planting trees and cutting new roads to the south of the town.[42]

The most detailed appeal for employment came from Carrick-on-Suir, where the situation was already bad before the potato shortage. The workhouse, with accommodation for 500, held 344 in late February and this number would have been much higher had the Board of Guardians not been rigorous in their selection procedure.

Ideally, the government should finance productive public works such as improvements to the navigation of the Suir.[43] One possible source of employment was railway construction. However, a likely cause of delay was the demand for compensation by landlords through whose land the lines would run.[44]

Potatoes were available in the Spring of 1846, but with scarcity prices rose. Competition was such that by early April complaints were voiced that the limited supply of potatoes in and around Tipperary was being bought up by merchants or speculators from surrounding towns. At the same time as it was feared that potato stocks would not last much longer than May or June, attention was directed towards the "immense" quantity of oat stacks at Dundrum. It was hoped (not very realistically) that Lord Hawarden would "hurry home" from London where he had a position in Queen Victoria's court, and direct distribution of his manufactured oatmeal at moderate prices to the neighbouring poor.[45]

The poor survived on a very narrow ledge at the best of times. By February it was being noted that fever was increasing in Clonmel.[46] It was the same in Tipperary, where the Fever Hospital (on Old Road) was crowded and the fever ward in the Workhouse had as many as three patients to a bed, forcing the Guardians to rent additional accommodation in the town. In late January this Workhouse, with accommodation for 700, had 524 inmates, a figure the Guardians did their best to keep as low as possible.

The newly appointed Medical Officer was shocked to find that inmates took their bedding from the Workhouse to the fever ward and (assuming they survived the experience) back again to the Workhouse. He also found most of the medicines in the surgery inert and useless.[47] An example of the almost casual callousness of officialdom were the prosecutions in Carrick-on-Suir of people for taking eel fry (locally called *"louógs"*) from the river, something that was a

customary practice. To their credit, the magistrates dismissed the charges.[48]

In March, following torrential rain, the "southern suburbs" of Clonmel were flooded so that persons coming into town had to use boats. A correspondent who had travelled through the hinterland of the town could hardly find words to describe "the utter want and destitution of thousands of the labouring population. Many families are literally without the means of existence".[49]

What was the government doing about this situation? One very fortunate thing that emerged from the report of the experts appointed by the government and who reported in November 1845 was their opinion that, at a minimum, half of the potato crop had been lost.[50] In fact, the situation turned out not to be as bad as this, but their alarmist report pushed the government further than they otherwise might have gone. The downside of this, however, was that the new government in power in 1846 was able to respond sceptically to reports about the disaster of the 1846 crop, which reports were all too true.[51]

This change of government did not take place until the end of June 1846, so that for the first half of the year the plans initiated by Peel late in 1845 came into play. These involved a temporary Relief Commission to oversee local relief committees, voluntary bodies who would collect money locally. These funds would be matched by the government and used to purchase Indian corn procured by Peel for resale to the needy, who could be employed in small-scale local public works. This food was to be sold at cost price as there was no question of providing free food. There would also be no question of interfering with existing commercial practice.

Charles E. Trevelyan

The key figure in the administration of this effort was Charles Edward Trevelyan (1807-1886), whose early career was in India, as indeed was his later career. In between, from 1840 to 1859, he served as the most important Treasury official, in which role he did his best to control (if not limit) government spending on Ireland. He worked extraordinarily hard, no doubt convinced that God wanted him to, and his almost obsessive reluctance to delegate indicated a belief that this divine confidence in him was his special gift.

Before he rode to his office from his home at Clapham he had already spent several hours at his papers before breakfast. "Dependence on charity", he wrote to a subordinate, "is not to be made an agreeable mode of life".[52] As a civil servant he was outside party politics, but by his background and instinct he was more disposed towards the Whigs, who took over the government in mid-1846.

His political master then was Sir Charles Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, a man who was both a friend and admirer. Of Wood, the *D.N.B.* wrote: "In 1848, he had no other remedy for the condition of Ireland than to leave the excessive population to adjust itself to new conditions by natural means" – in other words, by allowing the people to starve.[53]

From late March to early August 1846 local relief committees in Ireland raised a total of just over £98,000, to which the government added just under £66,000.[54] In addition to these measures, in March 1846 a number of Public Works Acts were passed which authorised public works, mainly road improvements. Grand juries at extraordinary presentment sessions could promote such schemes, but the full cost had to be repaid to the government. On the other hand, if the Board of Works directed a scheme, only half the cost had to be repaid. Not surprisingly, the latter method was the more popular.

Writing in 1848, Trevelyan expressed surprise and disapproval of the way in which landlords, who dominated presentment sessions, used such schemes to their own advantage.[55]

Early in March at the Spring Assizes in Clonmel the County Surveyor reported that there had been reluctance on the part of magistrates and cess (local tax) payers to raise money for road works. The only substantial work on hand was a bridge over the Multeen. In fact, he stated, he had £1,075 on hand which could give employment to some 150 labourers for five months. In his opinion, a particular difficulty was that from 400 to 500 contractors, only ten could be trusted.[56] ("Contractor" in this context often meant no more than a man with a horse and cart.)

By March pressure increased to have such public work schemes.[57] A meeting in Cashel chaired by Pennefather of Newpark decided to ask for £2,000.[58] The nationalist press was critical of the amounts subscribed by landlords to local relief committees. For example, Lord Stanley subscribed £100 to the Cashel committee; this was compared very unfavourably to the £30 subscribed by the P.P. of Tipperary to the committee there, the point being that if Stanley gave a similar subscription proportionate to his Irish income the amount should be £2,000.

To point out that "a vast deal" would depend on the generosity of magistrates/landlords was to state the obvious.[59] What was much less often stated was that "strong" farmers should "bestir themselves" and offer employment; otherwise in the words of the writer, "I tremble for the result".[60] It was one of the fears of Trevelyan (and other guardians of the free market) that large-scale public works would interfere with the traditional provision of labour. He later claimed that tillage had been neglected in the Spring of 1846, especially in areas where public works were most organised.[61]

By March 1846, therefore, there were three methods by which the poor could be helped. Magistrates and cess payers could ask the government for money for public works, which in time would be repaid; secondly, the government could be asked for an advance on certain public works to be undertaken by the Board of Works, half of which money would have to be repaid. Finally, local relief committees could galvanise their own districts. This was the theory. The reality, however, was local apathy compounded by official red tape.[62]

It was not until the second week of April that, at an extraordinary presentment session in Clonmel court house attended by Lords Lismore and Kingston and a host of South Tipperary landlords and cess payers, it was decided to take advantage of the first scheme mentioned above. Over £211,000 was applied for, although there was a certain amount of unease that this money would in time have to be repaid from local taxation. The money was divided as follows between the six baronies that made up South Tipperary: Clanwilliam £3,330, Iffa and Offa East £4,295, Iffa and Offa West £3,286, Kilnamanagh Lower £609, Middlethird £5,923 and Slieveardagh £4,090.

An individual like Lord Lismore, whose seat was in Clogheen with an estate of over 42,000 acres of which 35,000 were in Tipperary, was expected to exercise local leadership. He was Lord Lieutenant of the county but because of his age (he was 71) might have been expected to have been less involved. But Clogheen was among the earliest in setting up a relief committee and by the end of April several hundred families were in receipt of oatmeal and coarse flour. In mid April, however, both the government and the establishment within South Tipperary received a shocking warning of the price to be paid for their inadequate response to the gathering crisis.

On 15 April two letters written in Clonmel were sent to the government in Dublin. The two writers were of similar background and lived in the same community; yet their perceptions were very different. Ralph Bernal Osborne of Newtown Anner was English, had married into a local family and was MP for an English constituency. His letter pointed out that for the previous six weeks the peasantry were in a state of "great distress" and waited for employment measures to be taken but that local action had not been taken.[65]

The other letter was from Lt.-Col. Powland Phipps of Oaklands who claimed that the cry of starvation was a "crafty pretext" for people taking the law into their own hands. He admitted that a few families were suffering a good deal.[66] (It was typical of the ascendancy network that both men married members of the Osborne family.) At the time these letters were written the situation in South Tipperary was such that these different responses illustrate on the one hand the reactionary view (which may be summed up as "never mind the cause, suppress the violence"), while on the other hand the less typical response, which was to focus attention on the source of violence, in this case unemployment.

At a meeting of Clonmel Corporation on 26 March the plight of the poor in the district was discussed but, other than calling on the government to send Indian corn to the town, no concrete local action was taken. A few days later, in a letter to Dublin Castle, the mayor of Clonmel Charles Bianconi complained of the show of military force to protect a convey of flour from Cahir to Clonmel. His point was that another convoy had come to the town from Clogheen with no such protection, and even though the majority of the "horse's guides" were young boys, no protection was needed.

He then made the curious observation that the display of military power would do "much mischief" by "awakening the people to a sense of their progressive misery", something which had not yet been manifested. He added that those at risk in Clonmel numbered 5,647 persons, the families of 197 tradesmen and 730 labourers.[67] Bianconi's view of the situation was ludicrously optimistic.

By mid April, with food riots in Clonmel and other towns in the region, the government put much of the blame on the refusal of the people of Clonmel to organise themselves and form a relief committee. Bianconi was singled out for his opposition (not explained, but a matter of politics); but there was a certain grim satisfaction on the part of government officials at the way in which the riots had forced action to be taken. As one official pointed out, the formation of such a committee would at least show the people that "something would be done for them ere long".[68]

Given the daily evidence of ample food in the region together with the lack of employment to allow people in turn buy this food, theft and riot were not surprising. In late April for example, a correspondent wrote in a local newspaper: "As an instance of the amount of human food loaded at our quays for English stomachs, I beg to notice that on Tuesday last alone, flour and other produce to the estimated amount of £20,000, glided down the Suir before the eyes of our poor people. Is not this TANTALIZING? (sic)".[69]

Food Carts Attacked

The earliest indication that the people would no longer submit to their misery was on Thursday 9 April, when carts carrying flour from Cahir to Clonmel were attacked outside Clonmel by women and children and around a dozen bags stolen.[70] This was but a foretaste of what was to happen the following week. On Monday 13 April a convoy of 82 carts of flour was brought under military protection from Cahir to Clonmel. In spite of much abuse from crowds of women and children, the convoy was delivered safely. However, no sooner had the convoy arrived in Clonmel than the cavalry escort rushed to Mrs Shanahan's mills at Abbey, where an attack was under way by a mob who got away with some 30 bags of flour.

The reaction of William Ryan, a local magistrate, to this was not unsympathetic: "The unfortunate unemployed people here are in a desperate way, absolutely starving for want of employment or wages. I think it would be advisable to send some Indian flour to this town to

be distributed as really I do not know what they will do if they are not assisted in some way or other".[71] This same magistrate had been in charge of the escort for the convoy mentioned above and opined (undoubtedly correctly) that his convoy would have been attacked if not so heavily guarded.

That same day there was also trouble in Tipperary town. A crowd of some 300 marched through the town and, in front of the homes of James Scully a magistrate (in Bank Place) and Rev. James Howley the PP, made their feelings clear. Their spokesman demanded work, making it clear that the people's patience was exhausted and that they were more than willing to work for their food. A correspondent in the local press made the point that such a state of affairs "has been produced by the shameless and I would say heartless apathy of our neighbouring gentry and absent landlords". In an effort to calm the crowd, it was announced that a local relief committee would meet later that day.

But even while this meeting was in progress in the Market House (now AIB), flour carts were attacked and some bags taken. The intervention of the police caused further excitement, so that the military had to be called from the Abbey school (where they were temporarily stationed) in order to rescue the police from stone-throwers.[72] Adding to the misery of the poor was the increase in the price of fuel, ten shillings being the cost of a small load of turf which was then retailed to the poor at a halfpenny per sod.[73] It was undoubtedly the case that through the region the better-off were slow to organise and help the less fortunate.

There is no evidence that the spate of attacks on food supplies were co-ordinated, but they did have the effect of frightening rather than shaming the better-off into action. In Cahir for example on that same day Lord Glengall wrote in a panic to Dublin Castle (the Under Secretary Richard Pennefather was Glengall's brother-in-law) to the effect that it was very difficult to find men to assist the civil power. "Not one single carman", he wrote, "will aid his employers in protecting property".[74]

Also that day (Monday 13 April) a meeting was held in Golden courthouse chaired by Laurence Creagh of Castlepark and attended by a good representation of local landlords, including Butlers of Ballycarron and Ballyslateen. Richard Butler of Ballyslateen was the father of General Sir William Butler (1838-1910), who was to have a distinguished career in the British army and who in his autobiography described what he remembered of the Famine in the area.[75]

The chairman was fulsome in his promise to look after his own tenants, they (as he said) having fulfilled their obligations towards him. There is no reason to think that Creagh did not mean what he said; but he, no more than anyone else, knew not of the horrors to come. The bulk of his estate was a townland of 1,754 acres, which in 1841 had a population of 582 in 84 houses. A decade later, the figures were 249 persons in 36 houses.[76]

Much of the discussion at this meeting was taken up with various interpretations of the fact that earlier that month 104 paupers had left Tipperary workhouse. This could have been seen by the government as indicating that things were not as bad in the region as some were saying. Potatoes as the staple of the workhouse diet had finished at the end of March when the existing contract for their supply had expired. In spite of the guardians' efforts no new tenders were forthcoming.

The local representative on the board of guardians denied the story that the paupers had left in protest against a diet of Indian meal. In fact, bread had been substituted for potatoes, for dinner 16 oz. of the former in lieu of 3½ lbs. of potatoes for men; but the fact that the Indian meal story was abroad indicates the suspicion with which it was viewed. On the other hand, Routh of the Relief Commission in Dublin two days later was writing to Trevelyan: "I could not have believed that the Indian corn meal would have become so popular".[77] Of course, nationally its popularity was an index of desperation.

By the end of April Tipperary workhouse was using a mixture of Indian meal and oatmeal.[78] According to the local PLG, the paupers in question deserved no sympathy, and he warned farmers not to employ them. Regarding employment, Richard Butler declared that wages should relate "to the present price of provisions". The meeting ended with a relief committee being formed, comprising four magistrates and representatives of local clergy and respectable farmers.[79]

On the following day (Tuesday 14 April) there was still commotion in Clonmel as a large crowd found an outlet for their anger and hunger by attacking bakers' shops, the next best targets given that mills and stores had police and military protection. The town seems to have been under something of a siege, most shops and businesses being closed and the heavy military presence signalled by canon at West Gate. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Tuesday's trouble was the effort locally to blame "strangers", labourers from Kerry who were in the town in some number looking for work.[80] Later in the month, *Tipperary Free Press* attacked the *Cork Examiner* for daring to cast doubt on the leadership role in the riots of "strangers".[81]

That day W.H. Riall wrote to Under Secretary Pennefather in Dublin Castle (another Tipperaryman), not quite in the panic-stricken tone adopted by Glengall, whose letter of that day, with its episodic and staccato style, was of a man expecting the mob through his door at any moment. This gives the information that the attacks on property by the crowd or mob had taken place at around six o'clock that morning. The government response to this communication was to make the point again that, while property would of course be protected, they expected people with property to contribute towards the relief of the destitute and that government generosity would be in proportion.[82]

Around midday, with many angry people milling about the streets and especially gathered threateningly outside Suir Ville Mills, there was a real danger of fatal clashes. The situation was calmed by Ralph Bernal Osborne, who promised (in a replay of the situation in Tipperary town the previous day) that he would organise a public meeting later that day to initiate relief. This meeting began at two o'clock in the court-house, chaired by Osborne who gave a lead by employing a number of men at his estate and by subscribing £50 to the relief fund. It seems that the mayor Charles Bianconi had gone to Dublin the previous day to ask the government for help and returned on Tuesday with a promise of help.

The situation in South Tipperary generally and Clonmel specifically was a matter of great concern to the government. On Thursday, one of their chief officials arrived in the town to give practical expression to this promise. Predictably, the local Tory press attacked Osborne and the whole notion of calling a public meeting in response to such pressure, which was declared to come from "idle fellows" who "infest" the country. Several months later, a large number of men were tried for what had become known as the "provisions riots". Of the 88 defendants, all but 11 were found guilty and received sentences ranging from a few months hard labour to transportation. From the evidence at these trials, very large numbers were caught up in the disturbances, as many perhaps as 1,500 at Tubberaheena.[83]

On 7 April Routh had reported to Trevelyan that there was a possibility of trouble in Carrick-on-Suir unless employment was provided. "I know that Carrick-on-Suir is a lawless place", he wrote, "and that the richer class are quite indisposed to make any effort on their own behalf". He commented that while there were mills there and pressure on the government to grind corn there, it would be most unsafe.[84] He was not wrong about the possibility of trouble.

A relief committee had been set up in the town and on Wednesday 19 April some 150 men had been put to work under a Capt. Peebles, the government supervisor. It was hoped that this

would quieten public unrest, but at about ten o'clock that morning a discontented crowd gathered and, by ringing a chapel bell, roused the town. Men working on a relief scheme were attacked and driven off the Green. This had to do with an attempt to maintain wage levels.

The cry was that men were not to work for less than a shilling and sixpence per day. By now the crowd had gathered momentum and a number of flour stores were attacked.[85] This outburst was very much a response to increases in food prices, something even Glengall did not attempt to deny. In contrast to towns like Tipperary, Clonmel and Carrick, Clogheen and Cashel were relatively peaceful during that week.

Dobree's Mission

On Thursday 16 April the Carrick relief committee increased the number employed, but without increasing the individual payments. A week later soldiers were dispatched to the town, taking a large building adjacent to the police barracks for their accommodation.[86] On this day there was a small-scale disturbance in Fethard, a Mr Harvey's store being attacked and some sacks of flour taken.[87]

Also that day A.C.G. Dobree, a commissariat officer, arrived in Clonmel to investigate obtaining a depot for oatmeal. His identity was kept secret in order to prevent the price of oatmeal rising with the expectation that a government agent was in the market. What he expected to purchase for £18 per ton for cash could have increased to over £20. The best deal he could do was 100 tons at £17.50 per ton. He mentioned that while there were extensive mills at Clogheen and Cahir, they were "purely wheat mills" and did not grind oatmeal.

On Friday 17 April, writing to Routh in Dublin, Dobree explained that while the town was quiet, the neighbourhood was very disturbed and restless and that no supplies moved without guards.[88] The following day he again reported to Routh, describing his difficulty in getting a suitable depot but adding that he had the help of the mayor. The cost would be high but he felt he had no choice. Regarding the local relief committee, he intended to pay them £500 on Monday when their own funds had reached £1,000.[89]

Just under a week later, writing from Waterford to Trevelyan, Dobree gave a general assessment of the condition of South Tipperary. The towns were quiet, though the unguarded transport of food was not possible. (For example, on 27 April a number of carts laden with flour arrived in Clonmel under strong military guard, bound for Waterford from where it would be shipped to England.[90] The figures cited in Table 5 show that a relatively small amount of grain formed a net outflow, but such information does not impact on the reader in anything like as powerful a way as the almost incidental detail of the flour bound for England.)

Dobree, without any indication of surprise, related how during the disturbances magistrates wanted the military to fire on the mobs, such was the panic of the gentry. Fortunately the military declined to oblige, knowing that they had enough force to quell such riots. Regarding these same gentry, he noted that while subscriptions were coming in to the local relief committees, the urban middle class were more generous than the richer landed class.

Examples of subscriptions are: Bianconi £50, John Bagwell £100, Stephen Moore £10, T.S. Grubb & Sons £50, Malcolmson Bros. £50; in Tipperary Smith-Barry £100, James Scully £30, Lord Stanley £20 and T.C.D. £20. In fairness, the generosity of landlords and businesses should not be gauged on this basis alone. More practical relief measures, especially giving employment and helping their tenants, were of more consequence. But even allowing for Glengall's financial problems, his £20 subscription to the Clogheen relief committee was derisory.[91]

On the question of blame, Dobree was satisfied to target "a set of able-bodied vagrants from

the interior of Tipperary and Kilkenny [not Kerry] who recruited idlers at Clonmel and Carrick". He absolved the paupers of responsibility and noted that they were easily quietened when the ringleaders were in custody. (Evidence from the trials of those involved in the riots does not sustain this comfortable analysis.)

Those employed on relief works were paid a shilling a day, and Dobree was anxious lest this tempt "farmer's boys" to leave their masters. One obvious way to prevent this was for farmers to pay their labourers the same rate. On Friday 24 April, following printed notices being issued by the Clonmel relief committee, neighbouring farmers came into town and agreed to hire labourers at a shilling per day and their food. It is not clear what numbers were thus employed or how long it lasted.[92]

Regarding relief works, Dobree expressed the wish that they would not just be work for work sake but would contribute to the improvement of the country. (The employment given to some 200 men by Cashel relief committee, fitted this description. The men laboured to improve the road to the east of the town, principally by removing small hills. It was while engaged in this work that on Monday 20 April, when many of the men were crowded into the Town Hall waiting to be paid, the upper floor gave way, injuring a number of men, three of whom died later.)[93]

At the conclusion of this comprehensive report the writer mentioned that potatoes in Waterford were in good supply but very expensive, as indeed was oatmeal on sale in Clonmel. Its price was £17-19s a ton, whereas Indian corn was £10.50 a ton.

At the end of April such price increases were causing panic. At Clonmel market even diseased potatoes were being sold at sixpence per stone and better quality ones from 6½ to 9 pence per stone. At the end of January the price had been 4 to 4½ pence. (In Clonmel market in late October 1845 oatmeal was £13 a ton.)[94] This illustrates something that is very important in understanding the Famine, namely that the rising cost of food was much more crucial than its scarcity.[95]

In March the reports that reached Dublin from all over the region made it clear how desperate matters were; but the degree of local inertia was such that appeals to Dublin were thought the appropriate response. Examples include Ambrose Going, who declared that the suffering of the poor in the colliery district around Killenaule "cannot be conceived"; a correspondent who described how the people of Clerahan (in Iffa and Offa East) were starving and that parents were forced to eat potatoes unfit for food of even the lowest animals; and from the Church of Ireland clergyman in Emly a statement that there would be "unpleasant consequences" if relief was longer delayed.[96]

It took the disturbances during April to prompt the realisation that local areas had to take some responsibility. As the judge at the Quarter Sessions in Tipperary town on 20 April remarked, "Property must and will be protected". But he also declared that there was a need for charity from the better-off.[97]

When Trevelyan looked back on the provision of public works up to August 1846, it was with a large measure of criticism for the way in which the strict rules and regulations had been flouted.[98] In his view, very inadequate control had been exercised by local relief committees over who exactly were employed, how they were paid, what work they did, how this interfered with existing labour and wage relations and (not least in his perception of things) how landlords had abused the system for their own selfish ends.

"From the first commencement of the relief works", he wrote, "repeated warnings were given that the object was not the works themselves but the relief of the prevailing destitution through the employment afforded by them". The relief system established in early 1846

allowed half the cost to be paid by the government, but with local control.[99] Local relief committees were charged with the distribution of tickets to those entitled to employment on relief schemes. Something of the scale of these schemes may be seen in Table 6.

TABLE 6

Number of persons employed in relief works – 4 weeks July 1846[100]

Clare	368,763	Kerry	99,237
Limerick	207,811	Cork	32,663
Tipperary	145,017	Waterford	17,970

Breakdown of Tipperary figures – week by week

Week 1	25,935
Week 2	33,844
Week 3	42,937
Week 4	42,301
Total	145,017

Number employed on relief works Co Tipperary, by barony, week ending 1 August 1846

Owney & Arra	7,294	Clanwilliam*	3,190
Ormond Lower	6,027	Kilnamanagh Upper	2,856
Ormond Upper	5,625	Eliogarty	2,240
Iffa & Offa West*	4,166	Ikerrin	1,264
Kilnamanagh Lower*	4,041	Slieveardagh*	1,244
Middlethird*	3,583	Iffa & Offa East*	897

(*South Tipperary baronies)

The figures for a particular week allow a clearer understanding of the situation as monthly figures are cumulative. What is clear is the very difficult situation in the countryside through July and into August. Just under 26,000 were employed in the first week illustrated above. By the third week this had jumped to just under 43,000, a figure which remained largely unchanged for the following few weeks; the week ending 1 August followed immediately on the other four. The number of men employed both county by county and within county Tipperary very much reflect the extent of local organization rather more than local need, as evidenced, for example, by the relative positions of Kerry and Slieveardagh.

In the summer of 1846 the Tory party split on the issue of ending restrictions on the importation of cheaper corn to the United Kingdom, something the agricultural lobby opposed but which suited a country the economy of which was much more industrial than agricultural. Peel lost office and the Whigs (Liberals) entered government under the leadership of Lord John Russell. In late August the legislation of the early part of the year regarding public works was changed, placing full responsibility on the Board of Works and the total expense on local taxpayers. Trevelyan was of the opinion that what he called "This monstrous system of centralization" was the fault of the Irish gentry, who had neglected to do their duty.[101]

This new legislation (9 & 10 Vict., c.107), the Poor Employment (Ireland) Act, known as the Labour Rate Act, was initially not intended to be "reproductive", so that landlords would not

be able to use public money to improve their property. However, this was modified in October 1846 in a letter from the Chief Secretary, Henry Labouchere, which allowed for drainage and sub-soiling to be added to public works and also the construction of earthworks in connection with the spread of the rail network, something of particular relevance in South Tipperary.[102]

Because of the attention centred on Tipperary during April 1846, the *Freeman's Journal* dispatched a special correspondent to get first-hand information.[103] One of the places visited was "a wretchedly poor village called Ardmayle". Bianconi had recently purchased an estate in the vicinity and, from local evidence, was about the only landlord from whom help was expected. This same source, a strong farmer, attacked the government for what he perceived as its indifference and inaction.

In Dundrum the *Freeman's Journal* reporter found Lord Hawarden's tenants in a "famished condition". He reported how his Lordship had visited his property on Thursday 16 April, his tenants expecting something to be done for them. In the words of the report, something was done; his Lordship left for England on Sunday 19 April. Tenants were issued with notices to pay their rents due the previous November. There was to be no leeway.

The Hawarden estate had attracted a degree of national attention and nationalist notoriety earlier in the decade.[104] About the worst thing the reporter could think to write about this estate was that the tenants were even worse off than Glengall's tenantry, faced as they were with starvation, lack of employment and threatened with eviction. The reduction of population in the county, 1841-51 was 24%; on the Hawarden estate it was around 43%.[105]

From April relief committees were established in parishes throughout the region. Apart from the towns, places like Mullinahone, Fethard, Donohill, Ardfinnan, Drangan, Newcastle and Kilfeacle showed some signs of organizing to help themselves. It may be noted in passing that most of these committees banked with Sadlier's Tipperary Joint Stock Bank. In Tipperary town at a meeting in the Roman Catholic chapel in early May a special committee was formed to apply for a loan of £1,000 from the Board of Works in order to begin construction of a new church and thus provide employment. By the end of the month, it was clear that this idea was a non-starter; the Board of Works would have demanded, among other conditions, approval of the plans.

Nevertheless the committee decided to go ahead on their own, the landlord Smith-Barry having given a site and a subscription of £100. The P.P. Dr Howley contributed £300. (In describing this decision to go ahead on their own, one local newspaper declared, in an early use of the term; "Shin Fein, was the motto then adopted").[106] There appears to have been an expectation in the town that during that summer a veritable building boom was to occur with the construction of the railway, a military barracks and the church.

The church was the only one of these projects over which there was local control, and while the building of a new church had been planned for many years, its timing was directly related to the wish to provide employment. By mid-July an architect had been engaged and had laid out the site. He was Joseph Keane (d.1859), a noted architect of the day and responsible also for University College, Galway and the design of St Mary's Church in Clonmel, the building of which was being planned during this period also.[107] The idea of building a major catholic church during the conditions obtaining at that time was altogether too ambitious. The church was not consecrated until 1861.[108]

This so-called "chapel committee" in Tipperary town was separate from the relief committee, which by late April had about £700 and as one of its schemes employed a number of men whitewashing the poorer houses in order to combat the spread of infectious disease.[109] Over the following two months, some 200 men were employed removing hills, sinking sewers and

related work. The committee also had a supply of flour which was sold to the needy at a loss, exactly the kind of thing of which Trevelyan disapproved. Apart from the efforts of this committee, employment was also provided by relief works under the Board of Works. "Under these circumstances", wrote a correspondent, "the people appear contented, I might almost say, happy".[110]

By late July press reports showed that blight had reappeared with more virulence than before.[111] "The potato yield represented only about a month's food".[112] In Tipperary town the gentlemen of Clanwilliam met in mid-October in order to raise money on Clanwilliam property so that relief works could be provided. The County Surveyor, Samuel Jones, painted a grim picture. With a barony population of 22,448 or 8,384 families, and allowing each adult six oz. of Indian meal at each meal, which cost one shilling and tenpence per stone, together with a ½p-worth of milk, and assuming that two-thirds needed employment, the weekly outlay would be £3,260.

Not surprisingly, the assembled magistrates did not go along with this apocalyptic (not to say costly) vision. The chairman, Maurice C. Moore of Mooresfort (not of the present family in Mooresfort), delivered the usual remarks about their desire to do their best for the people while of course, being economical. This was the first so-called extraordinary presentment session in Clanwilliam, and it was the chairman's view that £3,000 per month over a period of nine months would meet local needs. For the moment, a figure of £19,000 was agreed, which would be levied off the electoral divisions in the barony in proportion to their net value.

For example, £3,000 would be levied in Tipperary and Cordangan, £1,500 in Emly, £600 in Donohill and so on. An application to spend £20,000 on work connected with the railway line between Tipperary and Cahir was rejected. Dr Howley, P.P. of Tipperary applied for £1,000 to be spent on the new church. Surprisingly, this was agreed (£644 then and the rest to be applied for the next session) though it was unlikely that the Board of Works would countenance such expenditure.[113]

Coinciding with the above, the relief committee in Tipperary town was reformed to consist of catholic and protestant clergy, magistrates, the chairman of the town commissioners and of the poor law guardians (Henry Massy of Rosanna), three medical doctors and as secretary, its most important officer, John Mansergh. They decided to meet each Tuesday and Friday at 10 a.m., and a subscription list was opened.[114]

Early in December, an anonymous letter was published in a local newspaper, attacking the lack of support for this committee from the gentry.[115] It was pointed out that the most important landlord in the town (unnamed but obviously James Hugh Smith-Barry) had contributed a mere £30, whereas earlier in the year when the crisis was not nearly as bad, he had given £100. This was in the context of a rental of £10,000 from the property. Another target (also unnamed but equally obviously Stafford O'Brien) was accused of having contributed nothing. Several months earlier when subscriptions were first being sought, Stafford O'Brien also refused through his agent who referred the relief committee to the estate's tenants, which of course was hardly the point.

By the close of 1846 the situation in and around the town was in a dire state, with large numbers of men without employment and those given temporary employment in relief works having to depend on ten pence a day with which to feed their families. A particular disappointment was the fact that employment on the anticipated rail network had failed to materialise.[117]

In Clonmel in late April a large former cotton factory on Old Quay had been taken over by the government as a depot for its store of grain.[118] By mid-May this held around 500 tons of

oatmeal and Indian corn, and a second store nearby, the property of Thomas Hughes, was also rented. Both were under a military guard. By that time, around 400 men were employed on relief works, mainly road improvements.[119] The crisis did not necessarily bring out the best in people. Porters employed at these stores, who were paid two shillings and eightpence a day (plus fourpence for whiskey), went on strike and demanded four shillings a day.[120]

In late May the local Tory newspaper reported that the largest quantity of potatoes ever seen at Clonmel market had been brought for sale on 21 May by farmers who had been holding them back in expectation that prices would greatly increase. That morning potatoes made fivepence a stone but had lost a penny by the evening.[121]

While one section of the population was facing starvation because there was not enough employment and what employment there was hardly paid enough for a man to feed his family, another much smaller section of the rural community faced a different prospect. At the monthly fair in Clonmel on 2 September, good prices were available for stock and there was a lively volume of trade. Pigs were especially dear as, with the scarcity of potatoes, feeding them became a problem.[122]

Early that September the government ordered the public works earlier discontinued to recommence and (as mentioned regarding Clanwilliam) presentment sessions were organised to raise money on local property, or more precisely to borrow money from the government through the Board of Works to be repaid from property tax. At the presentment sessions in Clonmel, Glengall declared that "he admitted to the fullest extent the general, the entire failure of the potato crop [and that] from 1 November next to 1 July [1847], it was morally certain that the greatest distress and destitution was sure to prevail".[123] While noting that the gentry should do all they could, the main thrust of his speech was that it was much more up to the government.

Just prior to the Clonmel meeting his Lordship had attended the sessions for Middlethird held in Cashel, and as chairman (he also chaired the Clonmel meeting) had managed to persuade the assembled magistrates and cess payers that the act under which they were

A meal cart proceeding under military escort to a relief station in Clonmel.

meeting (9 & 10 Vict., c.107) was a threat to property owners and that central government should finance relief works. A doomsday scenario was that the employment of 3,000 men in the barony over the following nine months, at tenpence per day and with 24 working-days in the month, would cost local property owners £3,000 a month.[124] In the end a miserly £1,500 was passed at the Cashel meeting.

At the Clonmel meeting Captain Bernal Osborne MP, who had been prominent in dealing with the disturbances the previous April, and whose politics were less reactionary than Glengall's, also spoke out against the act in question, declaring that if fully carried out "it would ruin us". This was very much the attitude Trevelyan spent his time complaining about, what in December he described in a letter to Routh as "the delusion of depending entirely on the government to save the country".[125]

Other speakers at this meeting were Dr Michael Burke, P.P. of St Peter & Paul's parish, Clonmel, and the mayor Bianconi. Burke pushed for the government food depots to be reopened. This was supported by Bianconi who attacked speculators who had raised food prices by as much as 30% when the depots had closed. A fortnight or so later Trevelyan was writing to Routh on this same point, expressing himself very forcibly that "our depots should not be open while there are supplies of oats and other food in the neighbourhood and that when they are opened, it should be at prices proportionate to the nearest market prices".[126]

Thanks to Osborne's influence, the Clonmel meeting agreed to pass presentments for £4,000, which (with £3,000 already available) meant that a reasonable amount of road-works could be financed. In an open letter to the Prime Minister dated 22 September Osborne told him that "you have no right to tax the landlord for the support of another man's pauper tenants".[127]

By the time the follow-up presentment sessions were held in Clonmel in late October some 300 labourers were being employed daily. The problem about Trevelyan's rigorous view of the market was that it ignored people's capacity for greed. While the proprietor of Marlfield Distillery could sell Indian meal to his workers at one shilling and twopence per stone, on the open market people were being charged two shillings.

At the presentment sessions a proposal to use £3,000 to purchase food and sell it 20% under cost foundered on doubts about the legality of such an action. Even though the scope of relief works in terms of their usefulness had been extended in early October, the gentlemen of South Tipperary remained very dissatisfied. Osborne, for example, indicated that he wished he could use some of the money to build labourer's cottages on his estate.

Finally, a presentment of £5,000 was settled on, with a promise that each district would get a fair share. For example, the electoral division of Clonmel had £1,795 to spend on relief works, mainly roads, whereas Kilcash had only £163. The chairman of this sessions was William Perry of Woodrooff, who later that month launched a broadside in a Dublin newspaper characterising the act under which they had met as no more than an excuse for jobbery and inefficiency.

What he would have preferred was a system whereby landlords could borrow from the Board of Works to carry out labour-intensive improvements on their estates. This money would become the first charge on the property and at least one man had to be employed for each £10 borrowed and paid tenpence per day.[128] This was a ship that was never going to sail, not least because of the suspicion with which landlords were viewed by the government and the existing mountain of landlord debt.

The Famine at this stage was much more a matter of rising food prices than food shortage. "What can an unfortunate man do", wrote a correspondent from Clonmel, "with eightpence a day that has a wife and family solely dependent on his labour and flour two shillings and

twopence per stone?" One Clonmel company purchased Indian meal at £5 a ton and retailed it at £16. While £5 a ton seems an unusually low price, the point about profiteering was undoubtedly correct. The memory of Peel's government was invoked and the need for food depots was stressed.

At the end of December Clonmel relief committee declared that the number of destitute labourers in the area was such that their labour "wasted" on roads at local expense was "pernicious", and they cited with approval the £19,000 passed by the extraordinary presentment sessions in Iffa and Offa West (Cahir) and sanctioned by the Board of Works, to be spent on labour connected with the extension of the rail network. The relief committee asked that £24,000 be passed for similar work within their area.[130] This appeal does not seem to have been listened to, as the year closed with £6,000 being sanctioned for breaking stones.[131]

The issue of spending money raised for relief works on work connected with the rail network was discussed at the presentment sessions for Kilnamanagh Lower held in Dundrum on 5 October.[132] This barony was dominated by the Hawarden interest, which owned over a third of the territory. Lord Hawarden chaired this meeting and what happened very much reflected what he wanted to happen. Such was the public interest in the meeting that the village was thronged, police and military being present in strength in case of trouble.

Hawarden announced that he and a neighbouring proprietor, Robert Clarke, had come to an arrangement with the Great Southern and Western Railway that the line would run through their estates. The point was that the work would begin in a few week's time and employ "the entire labouring population" of the neighbourhood. Therefore they had to be very careful how they taxed themselves in the meantime. The money on hand amounted to £349 and others at the meeting, such as the P.P. of Clonoulty (Fr. John Mackey), did not share Hawarden's optimism regarding the extent of the delay or the numbers to be employed, not to mention the question of labourers who lived at a distance from such rail works. In the end £5,500 was passed to cover relief works for the following two months.

With food prices increasing, relief committees called on the government for permission to use public money to reduce prices to more "normal" levels. Trevelyan for one was horrified at this idea, reflecting what the P.M. repeatedly stated: "It must be proclaimed from the Castle and in the Cottage that the government will not be answerable for the price of food".[133] It was not as if Russell did not understand that even in more normal times much of the Irish population did not receive wages that would enable them to buy food.[134]

By the end of 1846 senior government figures such as the Chief Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were fulminating about the extent of the "jobbery" and corruption of relief efforts in Ireland. In the Chancellor's words: "I have very little hope of the relief committees behaving honestly so long as they have no interest in so doing. That is the evil of their ... spending our money".[135]

The reports of officials in charge of relief works fed this predisposition on the part of senior government figures to think the worst of the Irish. These abuses ranged from the quite trivial to more elaborate transgressions of utilitarian economy. Cahir relief committee did not use cheaper and better quality gravel which was available, when supervising repairs to footpaths. Local relief committees were supposed to vet applicants for relief work and only issue tickets to those who met the criteria of destitution.

Some 1,100 men were employed working on the Cahir-Clogheen road, and the government official who inspected these works was appalled both by the idleness of the men and by the fact that (in his opinion) many of them were not in need of relief. Supervision was very inadequate and horror of horrors "many [of the men] were observed smoking".[136]

This same official, Captain Ogle, in his reports of December a month later, seemed to contradict himself when he stated that only in Iffa and Offa West (Clogheen and Cahir) was there regularity in issuing tickets, and the administrative pressures in the other baronies being such that works were even undertaken without Board of Works sanction. Ogle also noted with concern that ordinary farming operations were being neglected.[137] By the year's end, such was the pressure on officialdom in Ireland that Routh was refused permission by Trevelyan to take a few days leave over Christmas so that he could return to England "to take my Christmas dinner at home".[138]

Poor Law Unions

The poor law system had not been put in place to deal with the kind of crisis produced by the Famine, and the essential point about workhouses in 1846 was that they were not a first response option. The efforts of relief committees who raised voluntary subscriptions supplemented by government grants, and of local government through special presentment sessions to finance public works, were supposed to cope with the crisis. In 1846 it was more in the nature of a crisis than a disaster. Like every other aspect of life affecting the poor, the workhouse system was faced with a challenge.

Clogheen workhouse was built to accommodate 500 paupers. During 1846 the guardians were mindful to keep tight control over the number of inmates. Looked at through the year, there was an inexorable increase in numbers. Up to mid-May, the figure was under 300. Up to early August this rose somewhat over 300, the highest being 328, Then to mid-October, the figure declined again under 300, the lowest being 266. Up to late November the number rose through the 300s, and at the close of the year showed substantial weekly increases.

TABLE 7

Weekly increase in inmates, Clogheen workhouse 21 Nov-26 Dec.[139]

21 Nov 1846	373	12 Dec 1846	494
28 Nov 1846	423	19 Dec 1846	486
5 Dec 1846	452	26 Dec 1846	526

Also, during this period (March-Dec. 1846) the level of deaths in the workhouse at 48, or an average of 1.2 per week, was low. There was a correlation between higher numbers employed on public works and lower numbers in the workhouse.

The poor law union was financed by the collection of a poor rate and a comparison between the rate set in 1846 when the system was not on the front line, and 1849 when it was the sole answer to the accumulated burden of several years of starvation, disease and destitution, shows how light was the level of taxation in 1846.

Poor rate in each electoral division was levied according to the proportion of paupers in the workhouse who had previously been resident in that district. Not surprisingly, guardians were mindful to try and keep the rate for their division as low as possible. In 1846, for example, the rate for Clogheen had been set for 30 pence (two shillings and sixpence) in June; but on the proposal of one of the guardians it was reduced to 20 pence in August.[141]

Other civil parishes tried to have their areas constituted as separate divisions or at least transferred to contiguous lower rated electoral districts.[142] The point was that at every level of

TABLE 8

Union of Clogheen, Poor Rates 1846 and 1849.

Electoral District	P.R 1846	P.R. 1849
Cahir	12½ in the £*	35 in the £*
Derrygrath	2½	30
Ardfinnan	5	35
Tullaghmelan	5	35
Newcastle	5	60
Ballybacon	2½	60
Tullaghorton	10	35
Tubbrid	12½	35
Whitechurch	2½	60
Clogheen	20	45
Ballyporeen	7½	80
Kilbeheny (Co Limerick)	2½	60

(*Money expressed in old pence – 12 to a shilling)

society there was resistance to paying for the relief of poverty; it was invariably thought of as someone else's problem.

Cashel workhouse was built to accommodate 700 paupers. At the end of October 1845, with 510 inmates, the system did not appear to have much slack with which to cope with a major crisis.[143] By November 1846 the workhouse was so crowded (especially the female portion) that the guardians were forced to refuse admittance to applicants who clamoured for help outside the guardian's board meetings. At the beginning of that month the guardians decided that those who had not been admitted to the workhouse would be supplied with breakfast and dinner each day – in other words, relieved outside the workhouse, something the poor law commissioners were adamant was contrary to the spirit and intent of the 1838 Act.[144] In spite of this, the Cashel workhouse continued to feed numbers who could not get access to accommodation. Through November and December the situation continued to deteriorate.

By the end of November, the workhouse held 145 more inmates than the number for whom it was built. Outdoor relief was given to 245 starving people. The guardians were explicit that they had no choice but to grant outdoor relief "to preserve the peace of the neighbourhood". On 10 December, 230 paupers had to be refused admission.

One (perhaps predictable) result of this kind of pressure on the system was that discipline began to break down. Male and female paupers were mixing indiscriminately and, according to the matron (who was not getting on with the master, and therefore had an axe to grind) the dining hall had become a market-place with paupers buying up food and taking it out of the workhouse for resale.[145]

By mid-December the guardians had to take steps to rent additional accommodation, a store from Daniel Kyte, the merchant incidentally from whom they purchased their Indian meal.[146] In spite of the protestations of the poor law commissioners regarding outdoor relief, the extent of the crisis was such that early in 1847 policy on this had to change.[147]

Like Cashel, the workhouse in Tipperary town had accommodation for 700 paupers. In January 1846 there were 524 inmates.[148] A particular problem in the Tipperary Union was the increase of fever in the rural districts during the early part of the year. The fever hospital on the

outskirts of the town was also crowded and the accommodation for fever patients in the workhouse was crowded, with as many as three patients to a bed. Extra accommodation for fever patients had to be rented from one of the merchants in the town.[149]

By July the situation with regard to fever patients was becoming critical. Plans were discussed to erect special accommodation for fever patients on the workhouse grounds. This would take time and in the meantime there was increasing pressure to site a temporary fever hospital in Cappawhite.

An outside medical officer investigated the situation. Visiting the cabins where fever patients were left unattended, he was appalled by what he found. In Tipperary town he found fever wards crowded and two unattended bodies left like so much rubbish. Circumstances were such that reluctantly it was decided to rent premises for a fever hospital in Cappawhite.

Inhibiting factors were the cost and the precedent set, as this fever hospital was the first such in Munster under the provisions of the Irish public health act (9 & 10 Vict., c.6), passed in March that year. At issue also was a conflict between the local guardians and the Board of Health over spheres of control as any such facility had to be paid for from local taxation.[150] It was estimated that building a fever hospital in Tipperary would cost an extra penny in the £ on the poor rates.[151]

The amount to be raised to support the poor law establishment in the union as set by the new poor rate in September 1846 was £7,116. Four years later when the whole burden of relieving destitution was thrown on this system, the amount was over £14,000. Within the union, districts bore varying-shares of this financial burden.

TABLE 9

Union of Tipperary, Poor Rates 1846 and 1850.

Electoral District	P.R. 1846	P.R. 1850
Tipperary	25 in the £*	28 in the £*
Cordangan	12	24
Clonbeg	7	32
Emly	10	18
Lattin	10	15
Cullen	10	20
Shronell	5	6
Bruis	7	15
Solohead	7	18
Donohill	12	32
Rathlynin	7	8
Kilfeacle	5	14
Golden	12	20
Killardry	7	15
Bansha	7	26
Doon (co Limerick)	15	48
Grean	7	27
Oola	15	24
Kilteely	5	24
Toem	17	80

(*Money expressed in old pence – 12 to a shilling)

In theory the workhouse system was supposed to work in a mechanical fashion, its lubrication being precise rules and regulations. In reality, by the close of 1846 the collection of poor rates was increasingly difficult and the Guardians were faced with growing pressures. All of this only served to increase the inhumane nature of the system.

A simple episode illustrates this. On 1 September, a pauper (William Meehan) was prosecuted by the workhouse master before the petty sessions in Tipperary for having absconded from the workhouse on 29 August. His crime was having taken with him the workhouse uniform. The master in his report to the guardians was displeased that Meehan was acquitted on a promise that he would not re-offend and a threat of severe punishment if he did. Meehan was ten years of age.[152]

4 – 1847

In April 1847 an editorial in a Tipperary newspaper castigated the government of Lord Russell for its doctrinaire determination not to interfere with the course of trade or hinder private enterprise. The point was that Irish destitution was the price paid for this rigidity.[153] "Irish destitution" is a formal-sounding phrase that came easily to the lips of public servants and is the kind of language that sanitises cruel reality. The reality of Irish destitution by 1847 was the body of a two-year old male child taken from the Suir near Carrick who, according to the postmortem report on the state of his stomach, must have died of starvation.

At the beginning of 1847 the policy of the government towards Ireland still centred on local relief committees and the provision of public works, a policy about which, in the light of increasing destitution, the government had growing doubts. For one thing it was too expensive; for another (in a word much used by proponents of the market) it was not targeted and included the less deserving with the more deserving poor, distinctions which in the circumstances meant very little.[155] For example, in the week ending 6 March, 714,390 persons were employed on road works and 20,402 on drainage works, making a total of nearly three-quarters of a million persons nationally, at a cost of £257,709.[156]

In late January 1847 Alexander Somerville visited Clonmel and wrote a report of what he saw there. He was a 36-year-old native of Scotland, born and reared in poverty, who by his own efforts became a well known writer and polemicist sympathetic to working-class issues. He was sent to Ireland to write reports on conditions there for the *Manchester Examiner* newspaper.[157] The first things he noticed about Clonmel were the fertility of the surrounding land and the number of its busy mills, grinding Indian corn to meal. In consequence, there was a great and constant traffic of carts on the roads, all of which had to be protected by the military.

On the day after his arrival in the town he decided to accompany one of the convoys. That morning he was awakened at 5.30 by the rumble of carts; about dawn he ventured into the cold and very wet town to join the convoy. He describes the narrower streets "which lead down to the river banks" and "the great, the gigantic flour, meal and malt mills which stand upon the islands". The scene was one of great commotion, with "drivers of carts, millers, meal-dealers and police, amid hundreds of carts that choked up the narrow thoroughfares" shouting, swearing and pulling at one another. Buyers of meal from Cahir, Tipperary and other towns were there to purchase for the expeditions going in their direction.

Having hired a car, Somerville joined a convoy going to Dungarvan. This consisted of about 100 carts protected by 27 soldiers and their officer. Each cart was drawn by a single horse, and the maximum load was sixteen cwt. of meal. Payment for carriage was one shilling per cwt. "Most of the carts had come from places far distant from Clonmel [as] any owner of a good

horse can get employment for himself in carrying meal". It seems that the road to Dungarvan was so bad that even Bianconi had ceased to use the route. Robbery, according to Somerville, was an ever present threat to travellers so that few moved about without being armed.* As he did not intend to return to Clonmel with the convoy and having been warned to arm himself, he decided on his own strategy. Taking one of his carpet bags, he emptied it and "took it to a baker's shop and purchased several shillings' worth of loaves of bread and to a general dealer's shop and purchased a piece of cheese". Thus armed, with a proper recognition that any attack was motivated by hunger, he set off.

Somerville accompanied the convoy about half way and returned to Clonmel. His comments on the way in which people had been cleared from the rich grazing lands and crowded into the marginal land are of course subjective; but he certainly found much pressure of population on the upland owned by Donoughmore and Ormonde (among others), for which the wretched tenants were charged from £1-2 an acre.

Somerville was much struck by the realisation of the terrible impact of all that food being conveyed past starving people. "... groups of squalid beings were seen at road corners or running from the multitudinous houses, hovels, huts or cabins dotted on the slopes and in the bottoms by the streamlets' sides, to see the meal go past them under the protection of bullets, bayonets and cavalry swords, on its way to feed people beyond the mountains, hunger-stricken like themselves".

In a later report, while passing from Kilkenny to Tipperary, Somerville commented on the large numbers employed on the roads for tenpence a day and how "the roads are sadly cut up and disordered by the expenditure of that public money". In a letter to the Relief Commissioners written about two weeks earlier from Cahir by Glengall, a similar point was made. Having explained how public works had been curtailed as much as possible in the expectation of rail works, he accepted that this was no longer realistic and that "we must begin cutting up the roads in the barony to prevent plunder and starvation".[158]

In the event, early in 1847 government policy changed with regard to public works, not least because the Board of Works did not, in Trevelyan's opinion, get the necessary co-operation from the presentment sessions and relief committees in keeping down expenditure. In late February the Board of Works announced that relief by labour would shortly cease and be replaced by relief in the form of food. It was hoped to reduce the numbers in stages and be totally finished with all public works by 1 May. Not surprisingly in light of the extent of the crisis, this timetable was not adhered to; but the government's intention was clear.[160] The impact of these schemes, established under the legislation of March and August 1846 may be seen from Table 10.

TABLE 10

Average number of labourers employed daily as a percentage of the 1841 workforce – Public Works October 1846-June 1847 [161]

Clare	26%	Tipperary	19.2%
Limerick	20.9%	Cork	13.9%

For those employed on such schemes, there were problems arising from the facts that tenpence per day (when weather permitted work to be done) did not allow for the increasing cost of food and also constant delays occurred in being paid. Such delays resulted, for example, in an angry

* Crime during the Famine in South Tipperary will be discussed in a later article.

crowd gathering in Clonmel in early January and protesting outside the houses of the mayor and the county surveyor. At its worst, such delays (from inefficiency and shortage of specie) resulted in death, like that of John Flynn found dead in Ballypatrick, who had not been paid for his labour.[162] There were similar difficulties in Carrick: "a deep disgrace to any government".[163]

In the early months of the year finance for these schemes was still being raised through baronial taxation. Over £18,000 was levied on Clanwilliam, the highest sum on the electoral district of Emly (£3,046) and the lowest on Lattin (£525).[164] In Middlethird the chairman of the presentment sessions suggested that, in order to provide work for the following two months, £19,662 should be levied, which amounted to about one-fifth of the P.L.V. of the barony. The highest sum was levied on the electoral district of Cashel (£4,438), the lowest on Gaile (£703).[165] In Iffa and Offa West just £6,334 was levied, £1,482 on Cahir and at the other extreme, £174 on Whitechurch.[166]

Five or so weeks later these magistrates and cess-payers met again and revealed that there was a sharp division of opinion between the earl of Kingston and his colleagues. In the words of one of their number: "If we go on at this rate, our properties will be confiscated [and] we will not have a shilling to live upon". The last thing these gentlemen wanted was to go along with Kingston and raise finance for new works, rather than just finishing those already started. Kingston had hopes of works being carried out on his property. The sum agreed on was £9,000, to be spent throughout the barony finishing schemes.[167]

For many landlords and Glengall in particular, the prospect of large numbers of men being employed on works connected with the rail network continued to be a tantalising possibility and one which would relieve them of a large measure of local taxation. There were other advantages, such as compensation for their land being taken by the railway companies and in some cases logistical benefits.

This dominated discussions at the extraordinary presentment sessions for Iffa and Offa East in late February. A note of increasing familiarity was struck by William Perry of Woodrooff, who objected to more being spent on a particular electoral district than had been raised in that district. The definition of local property paying for local poverty was, on this view, to be very local. Glengall, in a letter read to the meeting, proclaimed his faith in the employment potential of the rail network being constructed.

But an obstacle in the Clonmel region was that a number of landlords were being difficult about allowing the railway through their property. This was especially galling, as the rail company was described as being ready and waiting to spend £59,000 on earthworks alone. Alexander Somerville in one of his reports had much to say about these difficulties and put much of the blame on Bernal Osborne, who however, was not among the few landlords named in newspaper accounts of the presentment sessions.[168] The amount levied on the barony was £9,732, of which £3,246 was to be raised on Clonmel.[169]

When the money authorised for Middlethird was exhausted, another £20,000 was passed in mid-March, half to complete works in progress and half for breaking stones. A month later, in light of changes in government policy, there was still some funding for stone breaking but no new works were undertaken. The fact (as one person said at the sessions in Cashel) that "the poor are famishing in and about" the town was of no consequence.[171]

In the second week of April the extraordinary presentment sessions for Slieveardagh was held, with Ambrose Going as chairman. The heated discussion provided much evidence of the kind of corruption linked with public works and why the government was so unhappy with them. The district engineer informed the meeting that £7,000 was on hands to finish various schemes and that a further £5,000 would be needed to conclude even "useless jobs".

Colonel W.B. Palliser of Derryluskan exchanged angry words with Dr Cummins P.P. of Killenaule (who was to die of famine fever in late June) over the building of a particular road that was of benefit to Palliser's estate. Some money had already been spent on this and Palliser claimed that the road would be of "signal use" to mining operations in the region. Cummins accused the Colonel of playing "the old game, self-interest", and noted that widespread opposition to the road was ignored and that the road would give Palliser direct communication between his properties at Coolquil and Derryluskan. On a vote the road was carried.[172]

Another example of corruption from the same region was aired in the national press. At a time when numbers on public works were being cut back, members of the Fethard relief committee inquired into the circumstances of the men working on a scheme in the townland of Knockkelly (civil parish of Peppardstown) in order to reduce numbers on the basis of least need. What they found was that a number of men, returned as being at work and thus paid, were in fact working for a local proprietor. This was made possible by the fact that the man in charge of the public works was the proprietor's man.

The Board of Works in an 1847 report stated that "we were in fact, no longer Commissioners of Public Works, but the administrators of outdoor relief to around one million families". In a comment likely to cause pain to the righteous proponents of the market, it was noted how the natural order of things had been reversed; rather than people being chosen for the work, work was chosen for the people and, with the scale of famine in 1847, the numbers demanding relief was greater than the road works could absorb.

This report also had something to say about the ill-planned nature of many of these works and stated that with the change in emphasis from labour to food as methods of relief, the situation (at least from their point of view) would improve. One example of productive work was the construction of railway earthworks for the Waterford and Limerick Railway line. For this under the August 1846 legislation £15,500 had been sanctioned between the baronies of Clanwilliam and Iffa and Offa East and West.[174]

In this same report the Board of Works delivered a "swipe" at local relief committees for their profligacy in admitting people to the public works schemes – In other words, the familiar notion that local voluntary involvement is a nuisance to Big Brother, who always knows best. An editorial in mid March 1847 declared that relief committees should be "instant, energetic, zealous, self-sacrificing, sparing neither means nor exertion".[175] This was at a time when they were under orders to cut back by an immediate 20% on the number employed on public works.

There were protests against what one source labelled this "insane policy of dismissing the labourers to the charnel house". At the beginning of May fears were being expressed as to what action the "infuriated multitude" might take in the vicinity of Killenaule. Apart from milling about the village and making demands on the relief committee, the energy appeared not to have been there for more sustained protest.[177] In Clonmel there was also protest as labourers thronged the town; but there was no repetition of the disturbances in April 1846.[178] As mentioned above, during the first week in March 1847 nearly three-quarters of a million men were employed on public works. By the last week in May this had been reduced to under 134,000.[179]

On 26 February 1847 the Destitute Poor (Ireland) Act (10 Vict., c.7) became law and marked a change in the government's approach to relief. This "soup kitchen act" was intended as a temporary measure until the poor law system was revised to allow outdoor relief, something that had been totally forbidden under the 1838 legislation that created the system. Various voluntary bodies had become involved in this form of relief in 1846.

For example, the Irish Relief Association for the Destitute Peasantry between September 1846

and March 1847 made grants of £1,450 for food and paid for 45 boilers in response to over 50 separate appeals, mainly from catholic and protestant clergymen within Tipperary. In Munster Tipperary fared best after Cork from this source.[180] Given the widespread prejudice against the Irish peasantry, a surprising amount of money was raised by voluntary subscriptions (including £2,000 from the Queen) before donor fatigue eventually set in.

The attitude of Elizabeth Smith, a native of Scotland, whose husband inherited an estate in Wicklow, was probably quite typical. On 12 January 1847, she confided to her journal that the Irish were:[182]

> "Idle, improvident, reckless, meanly dependant on the upper classes whom they so abuse. Call the bulk of the Irish what we will and no name is too horrid almost for them, here they are starving round us, cold, hungry, well nigh houseless. To rouse them from their natural apathy may be the work of future years. To feed them must be our business this [sic]".

Quaker Relief

Among those who helped, and certainly the most kindly remembered, were the Quakers, who had a strong presence in Clonmel, Clogheen and Carrick. In February 1847 Robert Davis of Clonmel made a tour of inspection through the extreme south of the county. At Clogheen he saw the provision of soup or, as he said, "rather porridge", which was well attended. From there he went to Burncourt, "where destitution abounds to a fearful degree", and which he thought was a neglected part of the Clogheen P.L.U.

The Society of Friends had established a "porridge kitchen" there and also at Tincurry and Tubbrid. Similar facilities were on the point of being set up at Ardfinnan and Castlegrace. On this tour of some 40 miles, he did not see more than 25 men engaged in agricultural work. In general, the land was desolate and uncultivated. In light of Somerville's emphasis on food only being transported under guard, Davis made the point that he saw flour and meal in transit without protection.[183]

In Clonmel in January 1847 the provision of relief through food was conducted by the Quakers rather than the relief committee. Tickets were sold for one penny, which entitled the person to a quart of soup and four ozs of bread, the actual cost of which was 1¾ pence.[184] This was being done when the relief committee was talking about setting up a soup kitchen. One powerful reason for this hesitation was reluctance "to support the strangers flocking into our town".[185]

By the end of February, the Quakers had distributed in one week 12,240 quarts of soup, nearly 6,000 of which were free, together with the corresponding bread ration mentioned above.[186] By May, with the change in government policy with regard to providing soup rather than work, relief committees were yet again re-organised and there were regulations as to entitlement. With some pride, the commission in over-all charge noted that the flood of paper work that poured forth amounted to 14 tons gross weight[187] – which prompts the thought that it was a pity that paper was so devoid of nourishment.

Taking his cue from such regulations, a writer to a local newspaper made the not unreasonable point that family income (such as it might be) should be taken into account. He went on to say, however, that free food should not be given to a person with a dog on the eccentric premiss that if he could feed his dog he could feed himself.[188]

The Clonmel committee did not start issuing rations until 10 May, after several weeks setting up an elaborate vetting procedure and giving two local merchants the contract to supply soup

and bread at a cost of twopence per ration. The committee's work ended in late August, by which time an average of 4,836 persons had been relieved daily at a cost of £3,258. This expense was largely met from a shilling and 2¼ pence in the £ on the poor rate. The scale of the work of these relief committees in the poor law unions of the region may be seen from the following table.

TABLE 11

Provision of rations as of 5 June 1847, P.L.U.s South Tipperary[190]

P.L.U.	No. of free daily rations	No. sold daily
Carrick	8,982	32
Cashel	23,047	–
Clogheen	19,886	–
Clonmel	11,583	4
Tipperary	27,564	412

On these figures, the situation in Carrick at that date was not impressive. Between 1 August 1846 and 8 February 1847 the amount subscribed to the Carrick relief committee was £300, of which nearly £114 was towards a soup kitchen. By early May the situation was critical, with stores barricaded. "It is impossible to convey a perfect notion of the awful sufferings of the people without food or employment. What is to become of them is a mystery to us all".[192]

A report from mid January 1847 to Routh gave the following run-down on the provision of soup elsewhere in the region. In Cahir it was provided three times a week at one penny a quart and free to families with no one employed in public works. In Fethard the distribution began on 12 December 1846, about 4½ gallons daily. There was also a separate distribution by the local Church of Ireland clergyman to 120 persons per day. This was financed by a grant from the Irish Relief Association.

By mid-February it was reported that meal was being sold at the soup kitchen run by the relief committee to the destitute poor at the reduced price of two shillings a stone. The paradox of the "destitute" being expected to buy this meal seems not to have struck the writer! Because of financial constraints, the relief committee decided to make a distinction between the poor living on property belonging to subscribers and non-subscribers.[195]

In Clogheen 500 persons per day were given a quart of soup and a half pound of bread each. By the end of February nearly 33,000 rations had been distributed, 56% of which had been given for purchased tickets. By mid-March this relief committee, which appears to have been among the better organised, had a budget of around £1,400, half from subscriptions (£100 from Lord Lismore). Within the parishes of Shanrahan and Tullaghorton, where the committee operated, there were three soup kitchens.[197] In May the agent for the British Relief Association (which in its first appeal in 1847 raised nearly £172,000, of which £25 was contributed by Trevelyan) visited Clogheen and surrounding areas and reported favourably on conditions, with the exception of Ballyporeen.

When later in the month other places in the region – Cahir, Tipperary, Golden and Cashel – were visited, this impression was confirmed. Between January and September 1847 the Association made grants of £5,090 to the county (compared with, for example, £19,507 to Cork).[198] In Cashel in January 1847 60 gallons of soup were distributed daily. However, none of this was free. The better-off could purchase tickets for one penny each and give them to the destitute.

In April 1847 a number of parish priests made reports on conditions in their parishes.

Fr Michael Tobin of Cahir declared that from October 1846 to March 1847 there were about 80 famine-related deaths, caused not so much by actual starvation as by debility leading to infection. He complained that rations under the February 1847 act were about half what they should be.

The land, he observed, was tolerably well prepared and tilled, but those holding from one to ten acres had no means of getting seed barley. Emigration was very considerable, especially among the more comfortable farmers. "Many more are preparing to be off as soon as possible and hundreds remain from the want of means".[199]

Fr William Kirwin of Boherlahan and Dualla reported about 150 famine-related deaths for this same period. The land of the destitute, those holding from one to five acres, was completely waste because of the necessity to labour on the public works. He anticipated with dread the reduction leading to the ending of these works. Holders of larger farms were totally demoralised and emigration was "alarming".[200]

Archdeacon Michael Laffan of Fethard reported 120 famine-related deaths during these six months. "The present condition of the people [is] much better than in many of the surrounding districts because of the increased exertions of the clergy of all denominations and of the landed proprietors. However, there is a fearful prospect before us". Land was generally given over to tillage and the crops were very promising. Again, emigration was very great.[201]

Fr Patrick Power, curate of Ballyneale, declared 122 deaths due to the cold and lack of sustenance. Deaths in the parish in proportion to births were five to one. People were unequal to the eight-mile journey to and from Carrick, where meal was distributed. Even then, because of the mismanagement of the relief committee, they received perhaps half what they were due.

He was not surprised that recently some cattle had been taken from farmers by famished people and, as all employment on public works had ended in early May, the condition and mood of the people was such that he feared the influence of the priests over the people was at an end. The only answer was employment. Crops were looking good and even potatoes were "shooting up in extraordinary strength".

In June Archbishop Slattery of Cashel and Emly wrote to the president of Maynooth, giving him an intensely gloomy over-view of the situation.[203]

> "We are still struggling with famine and fever and what is more than both, the demoralization of our people consequent on the system of relief that this incapable government has inflicted on the country. Every feeling of decent spirit and of truth has vanished and instead there is created for us a cringing lying population, a Nation of Beggars. It would actually make ones blood run cold to be an eyewitness of what we are obliged to submit to, the able-bodied obliged to leave their work and the youth their schools and spend their time congregated about the gate of a soup kitchen where their scanty rations are doled out, mixed up with all manner of persons good and bad".

One of the reasons why the archbishop was so set against the government was a report in early February by Captain Norris, one of the government inspectors, who complained that the relief committees, under the influence of priests (who in the writer's curious opinion had no land of their own and therefore no interest in keeping down tax) put too many of the wrong sort of people on public works, to "enable their flocks to pay their tribute".

Not surprisingly, the clergy of the diocese reacted very badly to this and made their views known to the government, who went through some motions of defending their agent. Within a short time Norris was moved out of the region and sent to the north of Ireland – where presumably, his views would meet with a happier response.[205]

Poor Law Unions

Under the legislation of 1838 a system of poor law was introduced into Ireland. By 1845 workhouses had been constructed which would be the high walls behind which the most destitute families in the poor law union would obtain charity. With the outbreak of famine successive governments tried relief through the provision of labour and then relief through the provision of food. However, by 1847 the government decided that an amended poor law system would have to bear the brunt of the crisis.

This from the government's point of view had two advantages. It reinforced the idea that the Famine was an Irish problem and, following from this, that it should be paid for from Irish taxation. The two pieces of legislation underpinning this change were the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act (10 Vict., c.31), which allowed boards of guardians to give outdoor relief under certain conditions (the most infamous of which, suggested by Sir William Gregory, was to the effect that persons holding more than a quarter acre of land were excluded from benefit) and in July 10 & 11 Vict., c.90, which created a separate poor law system for Ireland.

TABLE 12

Net annual value of property rated in PLUs, South Tipperary[207]

Tipperary	£148,326	Carrick	£89,871
Cashel	£130,293	Clogheen	£62,760
Clonmel	£91,108		

Leaving aside the question of how well poor rate was collected, Clogheen P.L.U. had the narrowest financial basis of South Tipperary unions. Given that this union had some of the poorest land in the region, this is not surprising. However, in terms of their financial management, they operated within their income up to November 1847. In December they considerably exceeded their income, a pattern that persisted for some time as the entire burden of relief fell on them.[208]

In the first week of January 1846, Clogheen workhouse held 226 inmates but by the corresponding period in 1847 this had increased to 556, a greater proportional increase than for any other workhouse in the region. As this workhouse had been built to accommodate 500, pressure was on the Guardians to secure additional accommodation.[209] By March 1847, the number of inmates had risen to 695.[210]

The year 1847 began with Clogheen Guardians being forced to deal with the accommodation problem. In the immediate term sheds used for storage of coal and straw were converted to temporary dormitories for 60 to 80 paupers.[211] By the following month a three storey building close to the workhouse was rented to provide accommodation for around 100, and in March extra accommodation was erected for sick inmates.[212] The authorities were impatient with the reluctance of the Clogheen Guardians to provide this necessary additional accommodation and even when the building referred to above was acquired, several Guardians were opposed on grounds of cost.

This was ever a factor. For example, in April 1847 it was noted with dismay that the cost of oatmeal had increased by over 60% since November 1845.[213] Not surprisingly, it was difficult to get Guardians to put themselves forward for election for some of the electoral divisions in the union.[214] The official records of these unions contain a mass of information, a high value being placed on keeping records. Often it is the incidental detail that casts the brightest light on the time and place. In mid-June 1847 it was arranged to have two of the paupers remain on watch

each night to guard the vegetables growing in the workhouse garden. For this, each was allowed one lb. of "household" bread and one pint of skimmed milk for his supper.[215]

One of the changes arising from the reform of the poor law system in mid-1847 was the organisation of each union into districts, over which a relieving officer supervised applications for outdoor relief and its administration. In Clogheen Union there were four such districts, Cahir, Clogheen, Ardfinnan and Ballyporeen. Nothing during this period so animated the Guardians as the giving of these four jobs. At a meeting on the last day of July to vote on the matter 22 Guardians were present. The meeting immediately prior to this had been attended by six Guardians and that immediately after, by eight.

The job carried a salary of £50 p.a., and such was the strength of feeling that tied votes for the Ardfinnan and Ballyporeen jobs, necessitating another meeting a fortnight later. A large part of the difficulty arose from attempts by some Guardians to have family members appointed. In spite of this pressure for the job of relieving officer, it was in the circumstances of the period, an extremely difficult job.[216] In late October one of the Guardians reported that the relieving officer for Clogheen intended to resign, having declared that for his entire salary he would not wish to again visit certain places in his district because of the scenes of misery and the pressure on him for help.[217]

In spite of increasing financial difficult, arising from growing demands on the poor law system and problems collecting poor rate, towards the close of 1847 the Guardians decided to rent large premises at Tincurry, some miles from the workhouse, which would house up to 400 children.[218] As mentioned above, in early 1847 Clogheen workhouse held 556 paupers. A year later, this had increased to nearly 700, even though by then the focus was much more on the provision of outdoor relief. (Figures relating to outdoor relief are not available until 1848.)

During the period 23 January to the end of 1847 192 inmates of Clogheen workhouse died, of whom 77 were under 15 years of age. This mortality rate on a weekly average was .67 of the workhouse inmates, a figure that was to increase greatly in the following years.

The workhouses in Cashel and Tipperary were each built for 700 paupers. However, in the year up to 29 September 1847 each experienced a different pattern of pressure.

TABLE 13

Money spent and numbers relieved Cashel and Tipperary workhouses, year ending 29 September 1847[219]

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Cashel	7,492	600	1,353	1,953	1,390	563
Tipperary	8,147	405	2,445	2,850	1,967	883

1. Expenditure for the year (£).
2. Number in workhouse at beginning of year.
3. Number admitted to workhouse during year.
4. Total number relieved in workhouse during year.
5. Number discharged and died during year.
6. Number remaining in workhouse at close of year.

From these figures it appears that Tipperary, starting from a position of greater control over numbers, was more responsive to pressures to admit paupers. Consequently, by the close of the year in question, while Cashel was nearly 20% under capacity, Tipperary was 26% over the number for which the workhouse had been built.

As in Clogheen, 1847 began for Cashel Guardians with considerations of overcrowding, especially with regard to fever patients. By late April, there was even talk among the Guardians of procuring the use to house fever patients. Fortunately, according to the medical officer, the type of fever was not especially virulent.[220] Table 13 shows how Cashel Guardians kept control over admissions to the workhouse up to the end of September 1847. Earlier that September the finance committee had warned that they were getting into serious debt, mainly because of difficulty in collecting poor rate.[221]

An impending financial crisis was one thing but the matter of jobs for relatives was, on the evidence of attendance by Guardians at meetings, much more important. In late August, it was agreed that close relatives would not be appointed relieving officers. A week later the Guardians were informed that the relieving officer for the Fethard area was a nephew of one of their members. Citing the Callan Union as precedent, a motion to rescind their earlier injunction was debated on 11 September, a meeting which 27 members attended and the motion was carried by 20 votes to 6 with one abstention.[222] Eleven relieving officers were appointed for Cashel Union.[223]

In late October, a local "landowner" attacked the Cashel Union in the *Tipperary Vindicator*, declaring that the duty of the Guardians was not only to help the poor but to avoid unjust tax, adding that he had complained to the Poor Law Commissioners in the hope that they would "prevent the class to which I belong from becoming the victim of a sordid and jobbing faction in this union".

Noting that the union was "insolvent" and much of the poor rate was uncollected because of the inability of farmers to pay, the writer sourly described how one of the Guardians, representing one of the poorest electoral divisions of the union, had proposed and had carried a motion that the clerk's salary be increased from £60 to £100. This was done at a meeting not attended by the ex-officio Guardians, who that day were busy at a magistrate's meeting in the town. He pointed out that the clerk of the very much larger North Dublin Union was paid £100.[224]

Underlying this letter was resentment on the part of the country's elite, under financial threat because of the financial crisis engendered by the Famine and striking out against an easy target, Guardians from an inferior social background. The point about difficulties in collecting poor rate was supported by the resignation of the poor rate collector for Killenaule district, who found it impossible to do his job because of refusals to pay and personal threats. His replacement was the sole candidate for the job. Payment was 5% of the amount collected. After a week he also resigned.[225]

The year ended as it had begun, with the Guardians frantically trying to provide accommodation for the weight of destitution crowding in on them. Premises in Canopy St were rented from Avery Jordan and a month later, in the last week of the year, a second house adjacent to this was hired to accommodate another 100 paupers. The picture painted in the records of the Union in November and December 1847 is of confusion and disorder as the Guardians (none of them professional administrators) were overwhelmed by the entire burden of famine relief being placed on their shoulders.

On 20 November, for example, over 500 desperate people sought relief but there was no workhouse accommodation for them as the Canopy St premises were not ready. Outdoor relief was ordered, without too much emphasis on the letter of the regulations and because many of the applicants were in such a wretched state, having come from the outlying areas of the union. As an emergency measure, they were admitted to the workhouse for the night.[227]

It was entirely in keeping with this whole scene that the matron in her report at the end of

TABLE 14

Tipperary PLU, week ending 19 January 1848[235]

Accommodation	Workhouse	700
	Temporary buildings	150
	Additional/auxiliary workhouses	200
	Fever Hospital (workhouse grounds)	50
	Total	1,100
	Number actually in workhouse	1,085

Outdoor Relief

District	**Number of cases relieved**	**Number dependent on relief**
Tipperary	665	1,461
Clonbeg	220	593
Emly	568	1,512
Grean	607	1,540
Toem	428	1,218
Solohead	308	753
Golden	435	996
Bansha	177	385
Total	3,408	8,458

Expenses of Union during week:	£1,348
Poor Rate collected during week:	£582

December declared that there was so much disorder and confusion that it was impossible to stand it.[227] That week between the workhouse and its auxiliary buildings there were 1,384 inmates, a massive increase of 146% on the figure of late September.

While the most fearful ravages of infectious diseases did not strike until after 1847, by February of that year the Tipperary Guardians resolved, with the consent of the Poor Law Commissioners, to move their meetings away from the workhouse to the courthouse. That same week 30 inmates had died, 18 of whom were children and all of whom had come into the workhouse in a greatly weakened state.[228] When the Guardians decided to levy a rate of two shillings and a penny on each of the union's electoral divisions in order to pay for poor relief, they aroused the ire of a local newspaper correspondent who periodically, under the identification "A Rate Payer", protested against their actions.

This was the old argument about better-off areas having to pay for the destitution of poorer areas. In this case, Tipperary and Cordangan were set against Bruis and Lattin. In any case, he concluded there would be difficulty collecting this money. He was not wrong about this. In mid-May, the poor-rate collector for Tipperary reported that several "influential" persons had refused to pay on the basis that the government was paying. At the end of that month the union had £332 in hands and was spending around £120 a week. There was over £1,300 outstanding. A month later, this same gentleman was looking for (but was refused) police protection.[230]

When it came to appointing relieving officers, the ex-officio Guardians were concerned that the right people be appointed and put forward the idea that candidates be given a test in

arithmetic to ensure that accounts could be kept. The union was divided into eight districts – Tipperary, Clonbeg, Emly, Grean, Toem, Solohead, Golden and Bansha.[231] By September the collection of poor rates had improved, except for the Emly district, where farmers had joined together to frustrate the seizure of livestock in lieu of defaulted payments. When livestock was seized it was in the face of considerable opposition and with the help of a large force of police. Farmers whose cattle had been impounded paid up.[232]

"A Rate Payer", in a letter of 12 August, had remarked that one of the Tipperary Guardians had "boasted" how the job of poor-rate collector was better than a large farm, even if extracting the money was unpleasant and difficult.[233] (It could also be very dangerous. In 1848 three men were murdered in the Glen of Aherlow arising from the collection of poor rate.)

In November this same correspondent described the condition of those applying to the workhouse for relief. On 16 November, some 200 people, many of whom had walked several miles and most of whom were in need of hospitalisation because of fever, tried to force their way into the new fever hospital, almost finished, on the workhouse grounds. There was a dispute between the contractor and the Guardians over this building and it appeared that some of the relieving officers encouraged these sick and destitute people to try and force their way in. They were told to come back in a few weeks' time.

"These poor people", wrote "A Rate Payer", "have these months past undergone the greatest privations, living on turnips, sending their children into the stubble fields rooting up the bad and unwholesome potatoes to be scantily found there; without employment, famished and in rags – no employment to be obtained".[234]

Comprehensive statistics about this workhouse are not available until January 1848. However, the situation obtaining in the week ending 19 January 1848 quantifies the picture of disorder and confusion described above.

APPENDIX

I. Number of persons relieved by labour from 10 Oct 1846 to 26 June 1847. Co. Tipperary.

Week ending:			
10 Oct 1846	3,000	27 Feb 1847	52,381
17 Oct	4,293	6 March	53,888
24 Oct	4,001	13 March	54,265
31 Oct	6,362	20 March	52,919
7 Nov	9,147	27 March	45,759
14 Nov	11,925	3 April	41,812
21 Nov	15,193	10 April	41,561
28 Nov	17,023	17 April	37,526
5 Dec	21,479	24 April	38,755
12 Dec	20,042	1 May	35,509
19 Dec	20,426	8 May	24,104
26 Dec	29,867	15 May	19,187
2 Jan 1847	27,541	22 May	15,575
9 Jan	27,310	29 May	10,779
16 Jan	31,674	5 June	8,847
23 Jan	33,208	12 June	6,832
30 Jan	40,339	19 June	1,288
6 Feb	43,048	26 June	1,035
13 Feb	44,532		
20 Feb	40,791		

(Source: Analysis of returns etc., 1852 (169), xviii)

The daily average number of labourers employed in Tipperary was 26,139. Nationally, Tipperary came fifth in terms of the provision of relief through labour (mainly road works) during this period. Cork was first, with a daily average of 41,291; Clare was second, with a daily average of 31,310; Galway and Mayo were third and fourth. Tipperary was fifth and Limerick, with a daily average of 23,368 labourers employed, was sixth.

Average number of labourers employed daily as a percentage of the 1841 workforce

Cork	13.9%	Mayo	17.2%
Galway	17.8%	Tipperary	19.2%
Clare	26.0%	Limerick	20.9%

(Source: Kinealy, Great Calamity, p. 99)

II. Food supplied under the "Soup Kitchen Act" (10 Vict., c.7) 1847.

A. Poor Law Union of Clogheen

E.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Clogheen	33,783	9,680	7,398	4,000	1,163	26/4	2,871
Ardfinnan	4,808	4,502	2,402	1,204	593	19/4	1,084
Ballybacon	7,784	4,212	3,109	2,128	1,300	19/4	1,092
Ballyporeen	22,207	5,094	6,907	3,405	2,101	26/4	1,663
Cahir	19,047	13,927	8,429	5,430	644	19/4	2,549
Derrygrath	4,037	3,390	1,346	503	168	3/5	136
Kilbeheny	20,791	3,154	4,291	2,036	1,778	19/4	906
Newcastle	8,105	2,850	2,953	1,642	1,334	10/5	834
Tubbrid	18,872	6,734	4,954	2,799	2,002	3/5	2,584
Tullaghorton	10,331	3,512	2,198	1,076	162	26/4	474
Tullaghmelan	4,217	4,068	1,852	746	425	3/5	158
Whitechurch	8,419	1,637	1,194	761	516	3/5	507
Total	162,401	62,760	47,033	25,730	12,186		14,858

B. Poor Law Union of Cashel

Cashel	18,787	22,290	12,281	6,551	3,065	3/5	4,326
Ardmayle	4,884	4,621	1,757	780	382	3/5	438
Ballysheehan	11,609	7,375	3,782	2,387	1,056	3/5	1,405
Clogher	10,440	5,078	2,920	1,463	362	3/5	800
Cloneen	8,016	4,899	1,809	1,141	320	3/5	653
Clonoulty	11,778	6,401	3,855	1,901	483	3/5	1,023
Drangan	8,025	5,662	2,705	1,337	424	3/5	733
Fethard	12,133	12,776	7,691	4,023	1,164	3/5	2,935
Gaile	4,556	3,513	1,439	683	326	3/5	454
Graystown	8,395	5,250	2,263	1,807	921	3/5	1,057
Killenaule	7,307	5,420	3,755	2,706	1,737	3/5	1,948
Kilpatrick	10,758	5,834	4,229	2,382	713	3/5	1,417
Kiltinan	7,681	6,725	9,638	1,047	219	3/5	587
Knockgraffon	13,426	11,442	4,394	1,658	229	3/5	982
Magorban	6,862	6,166	2,265	932	291	3/5	631
Peppardstown	10,624	7,670	3,044	1,525	179	3/5	848
Tullamain	6,483	5,870	1,812	905	210	3/5	559
Total	161,764	126,992	69,739	33,228	12,081		20,796

C. **Poor Law Union of Tipperary**

E.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Tipperary	4,570	10,357	7,311	3,268	967	26/4	2,397
Bansha	11,464	5,697	3,700	1,873	245	3/5	1,042
Bruis	5,084	6,416	2,353	735	93	3/5	370
Clonbeg	1,053	6,066	4,377	2,525	330	3/5	1,128
Cullen	2,328	3,455	1,835	627	103	3/5	325
Cordangan	4,829	6,941	4,223	2,099	806	26/4	1,600
Donohill	13,091	8,687	5,333	1,944	162	5/5	978
Doon	26,185	6,343	6,771	2,946	504	7/5	2,100
Emly	8,793	17,880	5,820	3,150	457	3/5	1,852
Golden	10,253	12,899	7,590	2,776	314	24/5	1,395
Grean	6,815	11,088	3,759	2,628	611	3/5	1,589
Killardry	8,899	6,486	3,728	1,769	433	3/5	1,011
Kilfeacle	7,143	6,703	2,176	944	81	2/5	600
Kilteely	4,386	2,942	3,475	950	310	3/5	603
Lattin	2,915	3,150	785	188	34	3/5	99
Rathliney	5,915	6,661	2,512	805	119	3/5	518
Shronill	2,731	3,703	1,114	119	32	29/4	98
Solohead	8,683	8,781	4,115	1,026	143	3/5	464
Toem	3,685	6,231	5,162	3,154	396	3/5	1,720
Oola	6,739	7,838	3,377	1,437	382	3/5	725
Total	145,561	148,324	79,516	34,963	6,522		20,614

1. Area of Electoral Division in statute acres.
2. Net annual Poor Law Valuation (£).
3. Population in 1841.
4. Maximum number of persons supplied with food in any one day
5. Number of persons on the relief lists when the supply of rations
6. Period of relief: in the case of Clogheen, until 15 August;
   in the case of Cashel, until 29 August;
   in the case of Tipperary, until 12 September.
7. Total amount advanced by relief committees (£).

(Source: Supplementary appendix to the seventh report of the Relief Commissioners, 1847-8 (956), xxix)

FOOTNOTES

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116. *T.F.P.*, 6 May 1846.
117. *T.V.*, 12 Dec. 1846.
118. *T.F.P.*, 29 April 1846.
119. *T.F.P.*, 16 May 1846.
120. Dobree to Trevelyan, 12 May 1846, *Commissariat series*, 1846 (735), xxxvii, p. 135.
121. *T.C.*, 23 May 1846.
122. *T.F.P.*, 5 Sept. 1846.
123. *T.V.*, 23 Sept. 1846.
124. *Dublin Evening Mail*, 21 Sept. 1846.
125. *Commissariat series*, 11 Dec. 1846, 1847 (761), li, p. 356.
126. *Commissariat series*, 2 Oct. 1846, 1847 (761), li, p. 108.
127. *T.V.*, 30 Sept. 1846.
128. *T.V.*, 28 Oct. 1846; *T.F.P.*, 7 Nov. 1846. Perry's letter was in the *Dublin Evening Post*.
129. *T.V.*, 4 Nov. 1846; *Commissariat series*, Riall to Trevelyan, 21 Dec. 1846, 1847 (764), li, p. 431.
130. *T.V.*, 21 Nov., 26 Dec. 1846.
131. *T.V.*, 20 Dec. 1846.
132. *T.V.*, 7 Oct. 1846.
133. Trevelyan, *Irish Crisis*, pp. 80-81; Russell to Bessborough, 19 Oct. 1846, G.P. Gooch (ed), *The later corresPondence of Lord John Russell 1840-78*, i (London, 1925), p. 194; Trevelyan to Routh, 1 Oct. 1846, *Commissariat series*, 1847 (761), li, p. 106.
134. *Hansard*, lxxxviii, 17 Aug. 1846, pp. 766-8.
135. Gooch (ed), *op. cit.*, Labouchere to Russell, 6 Nov. 1846, Wood to Russell, 2 Dec. 1846, pp. 199, 161.
136. Report of Capt. Ogle, 14 Nov. 1846, Commissariat series, 1847 (764), 1, p. 257.
137. Ogle reports, 5, 12 Dec. 1846, *Commissariat series*, 1847 (764), 1, pp. 321, 387.
138. *Commissariat series*, 1847 (761), li, pp. 352, 355.
139. BG 64/A/3, March 1846-Jan 1847.
140. BG 64/A/3, 19 Sept. 1846; BG 64/A/7, 10 Nov. 1849.
141. BG 64/A/3, 20 June 1846, 1 Aug. 1846.
142. BG 64/A/3, 3 Oct. 1846.
143. BG 54/A/4, 25 Oct. 1845 (The Cashel minute book Nov 1845-July 1846 is missing from the Thurles collection).
144. BG 54/A/6, 5, 12 Nov. 1846.

145. BG 54/A/6, 26 Nov, 3, 12 Dec. 1846.
146. BG 54/A/6, 17 Dec. 1846.
147. Woodham-Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-8.
148. *T.F.P.*, 28 Jan. 1846 (The Tipperary minute book, March 1845-March 1846 is missing from Thurles.)
149. *T.F.P.*, 11 Feb. 1846.
150. *T.F.P.*, 8, 19 July 1846.
151. *T.F.P.*, 9 Sept. 1846.
152. *T.F.P.*, 9 Sept. 1846; BG 192/A/11, 23 Match 1850; *T.F.P.*, 7 Oct. 1846.
153. *T.F.P.*, 10 April 1847.
154. *T.F.P.*, 14 April 1847.
155. Jones to Trevelyan, 13 Jan. 1847, *Commissariat series*, 1847 (797), lii, p. 7.
156. *Report of Board of Public Works re. relief measures March-May 1847*, 1847 (834), xvii.
157. A. Somerville, *The Whistler at the Plough* (Manchester, 1852) and reprinted as D.K.M. Snell (ed), *Letters from Ireland during the Famine of 1847* (Dublin, 1994).
158. *T.V.*, 9 Jan. 1847; Glengall to Jones, 19 Jan. 1847, *Commissariat series*, 1847 (797), lii, p. 19.
159. Trevelyan, *Irish Crisis*, p. 110; *First report of the relief commissioners*, 1847 (799), xvii.
160. Kinealy, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 99. See Appendix, this article.
162. *T.V.*, 6 Jan. 1847; *T.F.P.*, 6 Jan. 1847.
163. *T.V.*, 13 Jan. 1847.
164. *T.V.*, 6 Jan. 1847.
165. *T.V.*, 9 Jan. 1847.
166. *Ibid.*
167. *T.F.P.*, 27 Feb. 1847.
168. Somerville (Snell ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 58-9.
169. *T.F.P.*, 24 Feb. 1847; *T.C.*, 24 Feb. 1847.
170. *T.F.P.*, 13 March 1847.
171. *T.V.*, 14 April 1847.
172. *Ibid.*
173. *T.V.*, 17 April 1847; *The Pilot*, 24 March, 7 April 1847.
174. *Final report of Board of Public Works*, 1849 (1047), xxiii.
175. *T.V.*, 20 March 1847.
176. *T.V.*, 24 March 1847.
177. *T.V.*, 12 May 1847.
178. *T.F.P.*, 12 May 1847.
179. See n. 196.
180. *Distress in Ireland: the Irish Relief Association for the Destitute Peasantry* (Dublin, 1847).
181. See Kinealy, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-67.
182. D. Thomson (ed), *The Irish Journals of Elizabeth Smith 1840-50* (Oxford, 1980), p. 113.
183. *Transactions of the Central Relief Committee of the Society of Friends during the Famine in Ireland in 1846 and 1847* (Dublin, 1852), pp. 176-8.
184. Report of Lt. Col. Douglas to Routh, 16 Jan 1847, *Commissariat series*, 1847 (797), lii.
185. *T.F.P.*, 2 Jan. 1847.
186. *T.F.P.*, 24 Feb. 1847.
187. T.P. O'Neill, The organisation and administration of relief 1845-52 in R.D. Edwards and T.D. Williams (eds), *The Great Famine* (1994 ed.), pp. 235-44; First report of the relief commissioners, 1847 (799), xvii.
188. *T.F.P.*, 19 May 1847.
189. *T.C.*, 22 Sept. 1847.
190. *Third report of the relief commissioners*, 1847 (836), xvii. Note that figures relate to entire unions.
191. *T.F.P.*, 10 Feb. 1847.
192. *T.V.*, 5 May 1847. See n. 184.

193. See n. 184.
194. *T.V.*, 13 Feb. 1847.
195. *T.F.P.*, 17 Feb. 1847.
196. *T.F.P.*, 24 Feb. 1847.
197. *T.F.P.*, 20 March 1847.
198. *Report of the British Association for the relief of the extreme distress in Ireland etc.* (London, 1849), p. 77.
199. *T.V.*, 19 May 1847.
200. *Ibid.*
201. *T.V.*, 22 May 1847.
202. *Ibid.*
203. D.A. Kerr, *A Nation of Beggars: Priests, People and Politics in Famine Ireland, 1846-52* (Oxford, 1994), p. 41.
204. Norris report, 6 Feb. 1847, *Commissariat series*, 1847 (797), lii, p. 246.
205. *T.V.*, 10, 17, 21 April 1847; *T.F.P.*, 10 April 1847.
206. O'Neill in Edwards and Williams (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 246-54.
207. *Papers relating to proceedings for the series*, 1847-8 (896), liv.
208. *Ibid.* and *5th series*, 1847-8 (919), lv.
209. *Copies of extracts of correspondence relating to union workhouses in Ireland, 2nd series*, 1847 (790), lv.
210. 3rd series, 1847 (863), lv.
211. BG 64/A/4, 30 Jan. 1847.
212. BG 64/A/4, 13, 20 Feb, 27 March 1847.
213. BG 64/A/4, 13 Feb., 24 April 1847; *Correspondence, 2nd series*, 1847 (790), lv.
214. BG 64/A/4, 18 May 1847.
215. BG 64/A/4, 19 June 1847.
216. BG 64/A/4, 31 July, 14 Aug., 25 Sept. 1847.
217. *T.F.P.*, 30 Oct. 1847.
218. BG 64/A/4, 13, 20 Nov. 1847.
219. *First annual report of commissioners for administration of the laws for the relief of the poor in Ireland*, 1847-8 (963), xxxiii, appendix B, i, p. 135.
220. BG 54/A/6, 14 Jan, 18 Feb, 25 March, 29 April 1847.
221. BG 54/A/7, 4 Sept. 1847.
222. BG 54/A/7, 28 Aug., 4, 11 Sept. 1847.
223. For these, see E. Lonergan, *A Workhouse Story etc.*, (1992), p. 34.
224. *T.V.*, 27 Oct. 1847.
225. BG 54/A/7, 2, 9, 15 Oct., 5 Nov. 1847.
226. BG 54/A/7, 20 Nov. 1847.
227. BG 54/A/7, 25 Dec. 1847.
228. BG 152/A/6, 13 Feb. 1847.
229. BG 152/A/6, 13 Feb. 1847.
230. BG 152/A/7, 15, 29 May, 26 June 1847.
231. BG 152/A/7, 7 Aug., 4 Sept. 1847.
232. BG 152/A/7, 4, 18 Sept., 2 Oct. 1847.
233. *T.F.P.*, 14 Aug. 1847.
234. *T.F.P.*, 20 Nov. 1847.
235. BG 152/A/8, 15 Jan. 1848. The implications of these and other figures will be discussed in the final article of this series, in *T.H.J.* (1988).